Deregulation Using Stealth “Science” Strategies by McGarity, Thomas O. & Wagner, Wendy E.
MCGARITY & WAGNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019 3:58 PM 
 
DEREGULATION USING STEALTH “SCIENCE” 
STRATEGIES 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER† 
ABSTRACT 
  In this Article, we explore the “stealth” use of science by the 
Executive Branch to advance deregulation and highlight the limited, 
existing legal and institutional constraints in place to discipline and 
discourage these practices. Political appointees have employed dozens 
of strategies over the years, in both Democratic and Republican 
administrations, to manipulate science in ends-oriented ways that 
advance the goal of deregulation. Despite this bald manipulation of 
science, however, the officials frequently present these strategies as 
necessary to bring “sound science” to bear on regulatory decisions. To 
begin to address this problem, it is important to reconceptualize how 
the administrative state addresses science-intensive decisions. Rather 
than allow agencies and the White House to operate as a cohesive unit, 
institutional bounds should be drawn around the scientific expertise 
lodged within the agencies. We propose that the background scientific 
work prepared by agency staff should be firewalled from the evaluative, 
policymaking input of the remaining officials, including politically 
appointed officials, in the agency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any new president who, like President Trump, campaigns on a 
deregulatory platform is in for some unpleasant surprises after the 
election. Undoing regulation, particularly in the areas of health, safety, 
and the environment, is not as easy as it might appear. Rolling back 
most major rules is tedious because it requires notice-and-comment 
rulemakings under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),1 with 
 
 1. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 706(2)(a) (2012) (requiring notice and comment on informal 
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all its attendant headaches and delays. But it is also difficult because 
protective rules tend to be in place for reasons that transcend the 
politics of a single election year. A legally solid case for less regulation 
must surmount at least three significant hurdles that are endemic to 
federal regulation. 
First, the president’s agenda may be blocked by statutory 
mandates that, in some instances, unambiguously direct agencies to 
protect the public health and welfare, with uncertainties resolved on 
the side of reducing risks.2 To implement deregulatory health and 
environmental rules and policies, the president’s appointees will 
usually need to demonstrate, as a legal matter, that the deregulatory 
action is within the permissible range of actions allowed by an agency’s 
statute.3 
Second, the president may encounter a public that is not as excited 
about deregulation as industry stakeholders. A large majority of 
Americans, when asked, support existing health, safety, and 
environmental protections. If anything, these Americans would like to 
see them strengthened. For example, in a recent Pew Research Center 
poll, 74 percent of adult respondents (90 percent of Democrats and 52 
percent of Republicans) agreed with the statement that “the country 
should do whatever it takes to protect the environment,” while only 23 
percent agreed with the statement that “the country has gone too far 
in its efforts to protect the environment.”4 If voters find that their 
highly valued health, safety, and environmental protections are being 
compromised to line the pocketbooks of a handful of rich corporations, 
some may shift allegiances and oppose deregulation. 
Third, once the president enters the oval office, he becomes the 
head of a large bureaucracy that may not share his deregulatory goals. 
Turning that ship around takes a much heavier hand than simply 
putting into place a cadre of high-level appointees and articulating a 
deregulatory agenda. If the agency career staff is resistant, effectuating 
change may prove challenging because redirecting the bureaucracy is 
difficult. 
 
rulemakings and providing opportunity for judicial review of final agency action). 
 2. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1533. 
 3. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reversing and remanding 
EPA air toxics standard promulgated under the George W. Bush administration because the 
agency’s rule violated the legal constraints imposed by the authorizing statute, the Clean Air Act). 
 4. Monica Anderson, For Earth Day, Here’s How Americans View Environmental Issues, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/20/for-earth-day-
heres-how-americans-view-environmental-issues [https://perma.cc/3PL6-5LTL]. 
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One viable solution to this dilemma is to adopt stealth “science” 
strategies. By reaching into the science supporting past or ongoing 
regulatory actions and changing what the record says, a deregulatory 
president can sidestep at least the first two problems.5 Changing the 
science underlying a regulation allows the president to stay within the 
constraints of protective statutes. The president can show that the 
deregulatory action does not, on the face of things, compromise the 
statute’s protective goals, because the modified science demonstrates 
that his policies remain comfortably within those mandates. Equally 
important, manipulating the underlying science gives the public a false 
assurance that their health and environment are being protected. To 
this end, invoking “sound science” on behalf of an agency decision that 
in fact may be based on ends-oriented manipulations of the record can 
lend the patina of objectivity. 
Even if hurdles one and two can be overcome by playing games 
with science, the chief executive will still need to devise clever ways to 
grapple with hurdle three—the large number of career staffers, many 
of whom are scientists, who will most likely push back against efforts 
to manipulate science. Although overcoming this third hurdle can 
sometimes can be difficult, some well-worn paths by previous 
administrations to manipulate science to advance deregulation are 
becoming evident.6 This Article explores these strategies, uncovering a 
playbook of sorts that shows how deregulation-minded presidential 
administrations, including the current one, have reconfigured the 
science underlying regulations to advance deregulatory policies. 
In this Article, we trace out these stealth “science” strategies used 
to advance deregulation and assign them to three general categories.7 
First, some political manipulation of science occurs deep within the 
 
 5. Note that this tactic of covertly manipulating the science to reach a predetermined policy 
result parallels in many ways the ends-oriented, legal strategy of statutory abnegation explored 
by Bill Buzbee in this issue. See generally William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory Abnegation in the 
Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L.J. 1509 (2019) (exploring agency abnegation and its legal 
implications). 
 6. See Gretchen T. Goldman, et al., Ensuring Scientific Integrity in the Age of Trump: 
Policies to Protect Government Scientists Must Be Defended, 355 SCIENCE 696, 696 (2017) 
(observing that “[a]ll modern presidents–both Republicans and Democrats–have politicized 
science in some way”). 
 7. For purposes of this Article, we define “deregulation” broadly to include not only the 
revision or retraction of existing rules, as Caroline Cecot discusses, but also deliberate efforts to 
forestall the issuance of protective regulations as discussed by Sid Shapiro. See Caroline Cecot, 
Deregulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Stability, 68 DUKE L.J. 1593 (2019); Sidney A. 
Shapiro, Rulemaking Inaction and the Failure of Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 1805 (2019). 
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record of individual decisions where the stakes for deregulation are 
high. In these cases, the political manipulation targets individual 
studies, model algorithms, or other basic features of the scientific 
record. These manipulations sometimes, although not always, put the 
administration in direct conflict with staff by dictating changes to the 
staff’s expert analysis. This can result in embarrassing leaks to the press 
or whistleblower complaints that are inconsistent with the stealth 
nature of the enterprise. But even when the staff publicizes the 
transgressions, the administration has the final say and, in some cases, 
can prevail with a revised, less protective policy based on questionable 
science that is not objectively “sound” or “good.” 
Second, a new administration can attempt to deplete the scientific 
staff and its funding and adjust the lines of authority so that the 
administration makes the calls on developing the scientific record 
itself. When career staff impede top-down changes to existing projects, 
this second strategy reminds agency civil servants that, though the chief 
executive may not be able to fire them outright, he can most assuredly 
eliminate their positions. Staffers who do not fall in line are at least 
alerted to the reality that they must choose their battles carefully. 
Third, the administration can lay down new ground rules for how 
science is used in agency decisionmaking. If designed carefully, these 
rules can to lead to biased outcomes. For example, an administrator 
can revise procedures to ensure that peer review is done only by 
favored experts. Likewise, the administrator can dictate that career 
staff only consider research that meets narrow criteria established to 
tip the ultimate analysis in favor of a deregulatory policy. The political 
appointees can also ensure that the computational models developed 
or used by the agency are only those that move the analysis in the 
desired direction. These tactics are different because they attempt to 
change the ground rules for all the work that the staff does, not just the 
work on individual projects. 
Part I considers each of these techniques in the context of 
presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican, that 
have employed them in the past to advance deregulatory policies. 
Then, Part II analyzes these incidents before considering approaches 
to reform in Part III. 
An important limitation of our analysis, evident from this Article’s 
title and the Symposium’s theme, is that it focuses exclusively on how 
this playbook has been used by administrations interested in 
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deregulation.8 However, the underlying problems in institutional 
design that allow for the manipulation of science could be deployed by 
any administration regardless of the desired policy. Thus, if a president 
wishes to implement overly stringent regulatory policies, he or she 
could deploy many of these strategies to manipulate science to advance 
that agenda as well. 
I.  DEREGULATORY STRATEGIES 
Over the years, agency heads in administrations favoring 
deregulation have devised various strategies for overcoming federal 
regulatory hurdles through the stealth use of science. Administrations 
often present those strategies as necessary to bring “sound science” to 
bear on regulatory decisions. In this first Part, many of those strategies 
are identified. Examples are provided from past presidencies as well as 
the Trump administration. These strategies can cloak policymaking in 
the mantle of science to minimize opposition to what would otherwise 
be an unpopular resolution of a regulatory issue. The public, Congress, 
and even the courts may be wholly unaware that a model algorithm has 
been tweaked, one or more studies have been dropped from the 
analysis, or the peer review process has been manipulated to lead to 
the more hospitable oversight of deregulation. 
A. Adjusting the Substance of the Science 
Political appointees in agencies and the White House can change 
the outcome of regulatory initiatives by quietly manipulating the 
substance of the science upon which the initiatives necessarily rely. 
Upper-level political appointees have employed several strategies for 
accomplishing this result, including censoring agency scientists, 
limiting staff scientists’ input into agency decisions, tinkering with the 
models that the staff employs, putting off protective regulations to 
await further scientific input, rewriting reports used to support 
regulations, and substituting deregulatory policy for science. These will 
be taken up in roughly the order that they are applied in the 
decisionmaking process. 
 
 8. Several other limitations of this Article deserve highlighting: Rather than examine all 
forms of technical information used by agencies, this Article focuses only on the way natural 
science is (mis)used for rules and agency policies. We do not explore, for example, possible agency 
manipulation of social science and economic information. This Article also does not trace how 
stealth science strategies might impact governmental funding of research, focusing instead on 
regulatory decisionmaking.  
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1. Censoring Science.  Politically appointed officials can achieve 
deregulatory ends by preventing the dissemination of scientific 
information, thereby reducing the probability that outsiders will use 
that information in regulatory decisionmaking.9 The easiest way for 
upper-level agency decisionmakers to implement this approach is to 
promulgate policies requiring government scientists to obtain upper-
level approval before releasing scientific findings to Congress or the 
public. They can avoid censorship criticism by claiming that 
preapproval is necessary to ensure that the agency speaks with “one 
voice.”10 For example, the Inspector General of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) concluded that 
from 2004–06, the agency’s Office of Public Affairs had “managed the 
topic of climate change in a manner that reduced, marginalized or 
mischaracterized climate change science made available to the general 
public” and that politics were “inextricably interwoven” into the 
agency’s pronouncements in a way that violated NASA’s basic 
charter.11 Similarly, during the Trump administration, the Department 
of the Interior (“DOI”) required news releases on scientific studies 
undertaken by the U.S. Geological Service (“USGS”) to undergo a 
“policy review” by nonscientist upper-level officials in the 
Department.12 
 
 9. Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 696 (noting that political appointees have “prevented 
federal scientists from publicly sharing their research and expertise”). 
 10. See, e.g., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN 
POLICYMAKING, app. B at 39 (Mar. 2004) (describing a Department of Agriculture directive that 
required staff scientists to seek approval prior to publishing any research or speaking publicly on 
“sensitive issues,” a term that included “[a]gricultural practices with negative health and 
environmental consequences”); Susan Okie, Tensions Between CDC, White House; Health 
Officials Say Low Morale Could Threaten Agency’s Ability to Handle Crises, WASH. POST, July 
1, 2002, at A15 (indicating communications between scientists in the Centers for Disease Control 
and the public were closely monitored by policymakers in the Department of Health and Human 
Services during the George W. Bush administration); Andrew C. Revkin, Cheney’s Office Said to 
Edit Draft Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at A12 (reporting that Vice President Dick 
Cheney’s office and the White House Council on Environmental Quality sought deletions of 
sections of draft congressional testimony). 
 11. Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Office Is Criticized on Climate Change Reports, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 2008, at A16. 
 12. Dino Grandoni & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Official Said Scientists Went “Beyond Their 
Wheelhouse” by Writing Climate Change “Dramatically” Shrank Glaciers, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/03/07/trump-official-
said-scientists-went-outside-their-wheelhouse-by-writing-climate-change-dramatically-shrunk-
montana-glaciers [https://perma.cc/2ZQV-Q2JG]. In one case, the Department’s Assistant 
Secretary for Insular Affairs objected to a USGS press release stating that climate change had 
“dramatically reduced” glaciers in Montana in connection with a study showing that thirty-nine 
glaciers in Montana had diminished in size by as much as 85 percent since 1966. Id. 
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Another strategy is to prevent the staff from releasing staff-
prepared reports that are likely to stimulate demands for regulatory 
action. For example, an unnamed Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) official reported in July 2018 that political appointees at the 
agency, including a former consultant to the chemical industry, were 
indefinitely delaying the release of a completed draft of a risk 
assessment that contained a troubling conclusion: the widely used 
chemical formaldehyde posed a risk to human beings of contracting 
leukemia and other diseases at exposure levels typically encountered 
in buildings in which formaldehyde-treated wood was present.13 The 
EPA official reported that upper-level political appointees were 
avoiding creating a record of their activities by eschewing written 
memos and emails and relying on “a children’s game of telephone.”14 
Officials in agencies that fund scientific research can ensure that 
policy-relevant scientific questions remain unanswered by failing to 
write grants for projects aimed at answering those questions or 
canceling existing grants.15 In August 2017, for example, the DOI’s 
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (“OSMRE”) 
ordered the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) to halt all work 
on a study that it had almost completed on the health risks posed by 
mountaintop removal mining operations to residents of nearby 
communities.16 OSMRE had commissioned the NAS study toward the 
end of the Obama administration to evaluate several epidemiological 
studies concluding that such operations caused cancer and birth defects 
and to suggest new approaches to reducing those health risks.17 The 
DOI’s Office of Inspector General concluded that OSMRE had wasted 
almost $500,000 that it had already spent on the never-completed 
 
 13. Annie Snider, Sources: EPA Blocks Warnings on Cancer-Causing Chemical, POLITICO 
(July 6, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/06/epa-formaldehyde-warnings-
blocked-696628 [https://perma.cc/H98N-LW3Y]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Department’s Political Grant Screening Could Get Tricky, E&E 
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060070789 [https://perma.cc/
74LX-LNK5] (reporting on the Trump administration’s new Interior policy of subjecting grants 
to universities above $50,000 to review by politically appointed Department officials to “better 
align” the grants with the Trump Administration’s “priorities”). 
 16. Phil McKenna, Trump Admin. Halts Mountaintop Mining Health Risks Study by 
National Academies, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 21, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/21082017/mountaintop-mining-coal-health-study-scrapped-trump [https://perma.cc/G5C8-
3RC6]. 
 17. Id. 
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study.18 In addition, the decision blocked the NAS from illuminating 
these risks for the general public and decisionmakers in other agencies. 
Upper-level officials can prevent agency scientists from sharing 
their research with other scientists and the public by denying 
permission to publish their scientific conclusions in scientific journals 
and by withholding funds for attending scientific meetings. For 
example, upper-level officials at the Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”) and the USGS in October 2017 refused to allow scientists 
from those agencies to make presentations at a conference on the role 
that climate change plays in causing conditions conducive to the spread 
of wildfires, information of obvious relevance to the public and 
decisionmakers attempting to deal with wildfires throughout the 
West.19 
Finally, in the age of the internet, political appointees have 
influenced how their agencies communicate with the public by deleting 
information from agency websites. Early in the Trump administration, 
political appointees at EPA removed the climate change website that 
the agency had been curating for twenty years.20 The website reflected 
the conclusion of EPA’s scientists that emissions of greenhouse gases 
contributed to climate disruption.21 EPA’s public affairs office 
explained that the Agency was “updating” the website to reflect its new 
priorities, but as of late September 2018, the update was nowhere to be 
found.22 A former EPA employee, who had been responsible for the 
website, complained that “one of the world’s best climate science sites 
has vanished.”23 At the same time, several other agencies were—
 
 18. Letter from Mary L. Kendall, Deputy Inspector General, DOI, to Raul M. Grijalva, 
Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Natural Resources (June 7, 2018).  
 19. Brittany Patterson, Govt. Scientist Blocked from Talking About Climate and Fire, E&E 
NEWS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/10/31/stories/1060065143 
[https://perma.cc/EU6Y-4DPD]; see also David Willman, Risk Was Known as FDA OKd Fatal 
Drug, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at A1 (reporting FDA officials prevented agency scientist from 
discussing the scientific information relevant to the risk that the diabetes drug Rezulin caused 
liver damage). 
 20. Jason Samenow, I Worked on the EPA’s Climate Change Website. Its Removal is a 
Declaration of War, WASH. POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/i-
worked-on-the-epas-climate-change-website-its-removal-is-a-declaration-of-war/2017/06/22/735f
0858-5697-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html [https://perma.cc/F54G-B3UW]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. A Google search for “EPA Climate Change” yields a page on the EPA website 
stating, “[w]e want to help you find what you are looking for. You can view an archived version 
of this content on the January 19, 2017, snapshot.” Help Finding Information, EPA (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/signpost/cc.html [https://perma.cc/7U7V-CL7K]. 
 23. Samenow, supra note 20. Several cities have posted an archived version of the EPA 
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presumably at the direction of new management—making scientific 
data related to climate change less accessible on their websites.24 
2. Limiting Scientific Input.  Another strategy for achieving stealth 
deregulation is to sideline science by diluting, limiting, or even ignoring 
input from the agency’s scientific and technical staff. During the 
Reagan administration, the head of the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) effectively diluted the input of agency scientists and scientific 
advisory committees by allowing scientists and other advocates from 
pharmaceutical companies to play a larger role in determining how 
their drugs were developed, marketed, and advertised than in previous 
administrations.25 
Although the White House touted the need for “sound science” in 
environmental decisionmaking at the outset of the George W. Bush 
administration, it nonetheless consistently ignored the advice of 
independent scientific bodies in formulating its global warming 
policies.26 For example, in early June 2002, an EPA-chaired federal 
task force published the U.S. Climate Action Report 2002 laying out the 
scientific basis for its conclusion that anthropogenic greenhouse 
emissions contributed to global warming.27 It predicted that continued 
increases would “very likely” have severely disruptive effects in the 
United States.28 President Bush, however, dismissed the report as 
something that had been “put out by the bureaucracy.”29 The Director 
 
climate change page on their websites, but they are not being updated. Id. 
 24. See Coral Davenport, How Much Has ‘Climate Change’ Been Scrubbed from Federal 
Websites? A Lot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/climate/climate
-change-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4APS-HNSF]; Juliet Eilperin, Under Trump, Inconvenient 
Data Is Being Sidelined, WASH. POST (May 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
under-trump-inconvenient-data-is-being-sidelined/2017/05/14/3ae22c28-3106-11e7-8674-437ddb6
e813e_story.html [https://perma.cc/M9YM-JQ87]. 
 25. PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS AND ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 216–17 (2003). 
 26. Andrew C. Revkin, Bush vs. the Laureates: How Science Became a Partisan Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at F1. 
 27. Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. Sees Problems in Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2002, at 
A1. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Katherine Q. Seelye, President Distances Himself from Global Warming Report, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A19. Documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act from 
the Cheney energy task force showed that Bush administration officials had been closely 
following the report for months prior to its appearance on the internet. See ROBERT S. DEVINE, 
BUSH VERSUS THE ENVIRONMENT 176 (2004). In an email to Phil Cooney, the Chief of Staff of 
the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the head of the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute (“CEI”), an industry-supported think tank, had promised to help “drive a wedge 
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of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(“OSTP”) later assured an appropriations subcommittee that the EPA 
report did not represent official administration policy.30 And EPA took 
little action during the Bush administration to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.31 
After Dr. Andrew Mosholder, a staff scientist at the FDA during 
the George W. Bush administration, combined the data from published 
and unpublished studies into a large “meta-analysis” of the suicidal 
side effects of FDA-approved antidepressants, his analysis showed that 
children given the drugs were almost twice as likely to become suicidal 
as children on placebos.32 Although high-level FDA officials had 
originally agreed to allow Dr. Mosholder to present his findings at a 
meeting of the external scientific advisory committee charged with 
reviewing the relevant studies and making recommendations to the 
agency, they changed their minds.33 The science advisory committee 
therefore did not hear from Dr. Mosholder or review his internal 
report.34 
3. Safety in Models.  Many public health and environmental rules 
rest, in part, on analyses supported by computational models. Models 
are useful in this context because they synthesize a great deal of 
information in a rigorous and consistent way—and do so quickly. But 
models are by no means perfect. Because so little is known about 
mechanisms of toxicity for most chemicals, for example, chemical risk 
assessment models are necessarily premised on a variety of 
assumptions that often cannot be validated with experimental data. For 
 
between the President and those in the administration who think that they are serving the 
President’s best interests by pushing this rubbish.” Myron Ebell, White House Effect, HARPER’S 
MAG., May 2004, at 26. 
 30. White House Promises to Limit Legitimacy of EPA Climate Assessment, INSIDE EPA 
(Mar. 7, 2003), https://insideepa.com/inside-epa/white-house-promises-limit-legitimacy-epa-
climate-assessment [https://perma.cc/6TKZ-994X]. 
 31. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ 
FAIRE REVIVAL 108 (2013). 
 32. Elizabeth Shogren, FDA Sat on Report Linking Suicide, Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, 
at A13; see also Gardiner Harris, Antidepressants Restudied for Relation to Child Suicide, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 2004, at N20 (“Dr. Mosholder concluded that children given antidepressants were 
almost twice as likely as those given placebos to become suicidal.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Shogren, supra note 32 (discussing the FDA officials’ decision to change plans 
regarding Dr. Mosholder’s presentation to the FDA advisory committee). 
 34. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 32; Shogren, supra note 32. 
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that reason, experts in modeling concede that “all models are wrong, 
but some are useful.”35 
From the standpoint of a deregulatory president swimming against 
both legal and political tides, however, an analytical tool that provides 
so much scientific leeway and, at the same time, appears technical and 
esoteric offers a clear pathway for reversing course. A political 
appointee can slip behind the technocratic curtain and tweak model 
inputs, assumptions, outputs, and interpretations in ways that 
withstand public and even scientific scrutiny, but are in fact nothing 
more than raw politics and ends-oriented decisionmaking.36 
President Reagan’s political appointees pioneered many of the 
modeling maneuvers that are still in use today to advance a 
deregulatory agenda. Rather than advertise these changes as necessary 
to advance the goal of deregulation, however, they portrayed the 
modeling maneuvers as differences in scientific judgments.37 The 
Reagan administration’s efforts to protect the formaldehyde industry 
from regulation illustrate some of the techniques refined during that 
era. By the late 1970’s, the profitable production of formaldehyde was 
put at risk by a series of scientific studies reporting on the 
carcinogenicity of formaldehyde in mice, rats, and humans.38 Departing 
from its long-established assumptions for conducting carcinogen 
modeling, EPA concluded that there were insufficient data on the risks 
of formaldehyde to humans to provide a scientific justification for 
regulating formaldehyde.39 At the same time, the Occupational Safety 
 
 35. GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND 
RESPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987). 
 36. See generally Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher & Pasky Pascual, Misunderstanding 
Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293 (2010) 
(describing, among the challenges of using models for regulation, the political manipulation of 
models). 
 37. See, e.g., MARK E. RUSHEFSKY, MAKING CANCER POLICY 175 (1986) (describing the 
“political use of science” during the Reagan Administration); Nicholas A. Ashford, C. William 
Ryan & Charles C. Caldart, A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde: A Departure 
from Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 328 (1983) (describing EPA’s 
decision to not regulate formaldehyde under Reagan as one reached “long before any 
‘decisionmaking process’ had been completed”); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, 
and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 96 (1988) (concluding similarly that social 
policies and values adopted by agencies under the Reagan administration which lead to greater 
risks were typically not “made explicit nor applied in a consistent manner”); Eliot Marshall, 
EPA’s High-Risk Carcinogen Policy, 218 SCIENCE 975, 975 (1982) (quoting then-Representative 
Albert Gore, Jr. who similarly criticized the Reagan administration’s tendency to use science to 
justify political decisions to relax regulatory standards in order to reduce the burden on industry). 
 38. Ashford et al., supra note 37, at 327–28. 
 39. Id. at 326–28; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-216, app. B at 108 (1983). After President 
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and Health Administration (“OSHA”) administrator appointed by 
President Reagan rejected a labor union petition for an emergency 
standard for formaldehyde supported by a substantial technical 
bulletin by OSHA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (“NIOSH”) as well as a scientific consultant report by 
researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.40 Both 
reports concluded that workers were at risk and additional controls 
were needed to protect workers.41 In rejecting the petition, the new, 
deregulatory administrator relied on two in-house evaluations that 
were prepared after he had taken office—one drawing heavily on the 
industry’s analysis of the available evidence and the other an internal 
assessment that was “prepared in written form sometime after” the 
administrator’s actual decision to reject the labor petition.42 As 
detailed by Dr. Ashford and coauthors, the administrator’s decision 
rejecting the petition “depart[ed] from prevailing scientific opinion” 
and diverged from the agency’s own generic cancer policy for 
conducting risk assessments.43 
Appointees of President George W. Bush continued the Reagan 
administration’s tradition of manipulating modeling to achieve 
deregulatory results.44 In assessing the risks of mercury emissions from 
power plants, for example, an EPA Assistant Administrator instructed 
staff to run the models in different ways until one of them produced an 
outcome that was consistent with the administration’s “Clear Skies” 
legislative initiative.45 
 
Reagan replaced Administrator Anne Gorsuch with Bill Ruckelshaus following a series of 
scandals at the agency, Ruckelshaus agreed with the staff that formaldehyde did present a major 
health risk and should be regulated. Formaldehyde; Determination of Significant Risk, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 21,870, 21,874 (May 23, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 765) (“EPA has determined 
that by its 1976 criteria there is sufficient evidence to conclude that formaldehyde is a potential 
carcinogen in humans.”). 
 40. Ashford et al., supra note 37, at 346–47, 348. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 349–50, 353 (emphasis in original). 
 43. Id. at 351. 
 44. See Linda Greer & Rena Steinzor, Bad Science, 19 ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 2002, at 28, 34 
(outlining how EPA’s risk assessment for vinyl chloride contained methodological errors, such as 
ignoring studies that covered cancers other than liver cancers). 
 45. Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Accused of a Predetermined Finding on Mercury, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 4, 2005, at A16; Jennifer 8. Lee, White House Downplayed the Risks of Mercury in Proposed 
Rules, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at 7A; John Shiffman & John Sullivan, EPA’s 
Court Follies Sow Doubt, Delay, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 8, 2008, at A1; Shankar Vedantam, EPA 
Distorted Mercury Analysis, GAO Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A9. In an opinion that 
found EPA’s logic comparable to that of the Queen of Hearts in Lewis Carroll’s Through the 
Looking Glass, the D.C. Circuit in 2008 vacated the regulations, but the court did not reference 
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The George W. Bush administration took the effort to a new level 
when its Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) drafted “risk 
assessment” guidelines aimed at regularizing all agency assessment 
practices across all regulatory agencies.46 When the proposed 
guidelines became controversial, OIRA requested that the NAS 
review them.47 Noting that the project itself departed from scientific 
practice by attempting to create a one-size-fits-all template for risk 
assessment models,48 the NAS’s evaluation underscored how OIRA’s 
guidelines were poised to slow down the already ossified risk 
assessments process and to move the agencies from protective 
endpoints towards more centralized estimates of risk.49 The NAS 
report substantially reined in this initiative, producing final guidelines 
that were considerably less prescriptive.50 
The Trump administration appears to be continuing many of these 
model maneuvers. But it is also innovating new techniques. One of the 
most creative is EPA’s “transparency” proposal that would, inter alia, 
require staff to go through a long punch list of alternative assumptions 
and model runs for every regulatory initiative.51 There is no 
explanation in the proposal of the scientific appropriateness of these 
requirements, why this resource-intensive and time-consuming 
exercise is being required, or how the requirements dovetail with 
existing agency practices. Still more significant is the proposal’s open 
invitation to private parties to create alternative risk assessment 
 
the machinations of the Assistant Administrator and White House officials. New Jersey v. EPA, 
517 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 46. See generally Sally Katzen, OMB, Memorandum for Regulatory Working Group, 
Principles for Risk Assessment (Jan. 12, 1995), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/jan1995_risk_analysis_principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RK22-99ZP]. 
 47. Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083, 
1084 (2007). 
 48. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT 
BULLETIN FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET 1 (2007). 
 49. Id. at 6–8.  
 50. See generally Memorandum from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Mgmt., & Budget 
& Sharon L. Hays, Assoc. Dir., Office of Sci. & Tech. to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies 
(Sept. 19, 2007), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2007/
m07-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7TW-XR6G]. 
 51. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,768, 18,774 (Apr. 30, 
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30). The list of generically imposed requirements includes, 
among other things, “clearly explain[ing] the scientific basis for each model assumption used and 
present[ing] analyses showing the sensitivity of the modeled results to alternative assumptions.” 
Id. at 18,774 (emphasis added). 
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models, along with a requirement in the proposal that the agency “give 
explicit consideration” to all of these private models.52 By inundating 
the agency with dozens of models for a particular regulatory project 
and forcing EPA to extract and evaluate the dozens and often 
hundreds of underlying assumptions and algorithms buried in each 
model, private parties can slow the staff’s progress to a crawl. Whatever 
signals might have been produced by several high quality, rigorously 
vetted agency models are at risk of being lost in the cacophonous noise 
of unlimited, unrestricted industry-created models. 
4. Studying Rather than Acting and Raising the Burden of Proof.  
President Reagan originated the “study-rather-than-act” move.53 This 
tactic forestalls government action by highlighting scientific 
uncertainties in the underlying scientific research, while waiting until 
more research can be undertaken to reduce those uncertainties.54 In 
the context of precautionary statutes, this has the practical effect of 
raising the burden of proof with respect to facts that must be grounded 
in the rulemaking record. It also puts off regulatory action while 
scientists conduct additional research and the agency staff incorporates 
the new research into relevant rulemaking documents. During the 
early years of the Reagan administration, upper-level political 
appointees in EPA invoked the need for “Good Science” to demand 
hard proof that a pollutant was harming human health or damaging the 
environment before it was willing to take protective action.55 Some 
scientists outside the agency saw this as a “‘covert’ attempt to radically 
revise and soften regulations.”56 
This tactic continued into the George W. Bush administration. 
Despite hundreds of studies and reports demonstrating that emissions 
 
 52. Id. Unlike the agency’s modeling practices, the private parties submitting alternative 
models are not bound by any transparency requirements. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., JONATHAN LASH, A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S 
ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 131 (1984). 
 54. Jonathan Foley & Christine Arena, How to Defeat Those Who are Waging War on 
Science, SCI. AM. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/how-to-defeat-
those-who-are-waging-war-on-science [https://perma.cc/2D8G-QKCJ] (noting that “[t]he 
systematic use of so-called ‘uncertainty’ surrounding well-established scientific ideas has proven 
to be a reliable method for manipulating public perception and stalling political action”). 
 55. LASH, supra note 53, at 131; Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, 
and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1662 & n.40 (1991) (“[T]here is abundant evidence 
that administrators [of EPA under Reagan] frequently chose to ‘study’ uncertain issues as a way 
to avoid resolving them.”). 
 56. LASH, supra note 53, at 149 (citations omitted). 
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of “greenhouse gasses,” such as carbon dioxide, were causing global 
temperatures to rise at an alarming rate, the George W. Bush 
administration decided to delay any action to reduce those emissions 
pending further study.57 The administration, however, went a step 
further to edit the technical reports on climate change released by the 
government.58 At least two reports were edited by Philip Cooney, an 
attorney who had worked for the American Petroleum Institute 
immediately before joining the White House.59 As one expert put it, 
“The dozens of changes [made by Cooney], while sometimes as subtle 
as the insertion of the phrase ‘significant and fundamental’ before the 
word ‘uncertainties,’ tend[ed] to produce an air of doubt about findings 
that most climate experts say are robust.”60 In February 2003, a panel 
assembled by the NAS criticized the edited draft, finding that it lacked 
“a guiding vision, executable goals, clear timetables and criteria for 
measuring progress.”61 More important, the plan contemplated 
research aimed at resolving scientific uncertainties in areas where most 
uncertainties had already been resolved.62 Only a few months after the 
media reported on Cooney’s role in editing the reports, he left his 
position as chief of staff to the White House Council on Environmental 
Quality to work for the Exxon Corporation.63 
Perhaps the best example of the study-rather-than-act strategy is 
EPA’s decades-long equivocation over the toxic effects of the pesticide 
chlorpyrifos (also known as Dursban or Lorsban) on fetuses, infants 
and children. The most heavily used of the class of “organophosphate” 
insecticides, chlorpyrifos is a potent neurotoxin that is closely related 
to the chemical warfare agent sarin.64 In the years after Dow Chemical 
Company (“Dow”) received a registration in 1965, it became one of 
 
 57. DEVINE, supra note 29, at 175. 
 58. Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Edited Climate Reports, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at A1. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Andrew C. Revkin, Panel of Experts Faults Bush Plan to Study Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
26, 2003, at A1. 
 62. Whitman Defends Climate Research Plan Against NAS Criticism, INSIDE EPA (Feb. 28, 
2003), https://insideepa.com/inside-epa/whitman-defends-climate-research-plan-against-nas-
criticism [https://perma.cc/4RM9-4AFQ]. According to one panel member, “[i]n some areas it’s 
as if these people were not cognizant of the existing science.” Revkin, supra note 61.  
 63. Andrew C. Revkin, Ex-Bush Aide Who Edited Climate Reports to Join ExxonMobil, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at A13. 
 64. Roni Caryn Rabin, E.P.A. Lags on Pesticide Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2017, at D1; 
Sharon Lerner, Poison Fruit, INTERCEPT (Jan. 14, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/01/14/dow
-chemical-wants-farmers-to-keep-using-a-pesticide-linked-to-autism-and-adhd [https://perma.cc/
RU4M-ZNJC]. 
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the most heavily used pesticides in the country.65 Its registrations for 
home use, however, were voluntarily cancelled in 2000 after poison 
control centers in the United States received reports of more than 7,000 
acute poisonings attributable to chlorpyrifos.66 
The ban of chlorpyrifos for home use came at an opportune time 
for an epidemiological study undertaken by Dr. Virginia Rauh at 
Columbia University’s Center for Children’s Environmental Health. 
The study catalogued the effects of home use pesticides on 725 African-
American and Dominican mothers and their children living in New 
York City.67 The ban allowed the researchers to compare babies who 
had been exposed to the higher levels of chlorpyrifos in their homes 
before the ban with those who had been exposed to the virtually 
nonexistent levels after the ban.68 The results were startling. Babies 
who were exposed to greater levels of the pesticide were on average 
smaller than, weighed less at ages two and three than, and did not react 
as well to stimuli as the babies who were exposed to less chlorpyrifos.69 
And the dose-related disparities persisted for many years.70 As time 
went on, the highly exposed children lagged in motor and mental 
development.71 At age seven, the highly exposed children had lower 
IQs and higher working memory deficits.72 Another study of urban 
children by epidemiologists at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York 
observed similar effects.73 Meanwhile, a study conducted by University 
of California at Berkeley epidemiologists of the effects of chlorpyrifos 
on mothers and children near agricultural operations in California 
where chlorpyrifos was heavily used found that highly exposed children 
had lower IQs and poorer cognitive functions than less exposed 
children.74 Published in 2014, the study also found that the children of 
women who lived near the fields during their pregnancies had 
significantly higher autism rates.75 
 
 65. Lerner, supra note 64. 
 66. Chlorpyrifos; Tolerance Revocations, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,080, 69,082 (Nov. 6, 2015) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180); Lerner, supra note 64. 
 67. Rabin, supra note 64, at D1; Lerner, supra note 64. 
 68. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 69. Lerner, supra note 64. 
 70. Rabin, supra note 64, at D1; Lerner, supra note 64. 
 71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. Studies on laboratory animals lent credence to the epidemiological studies. Dr. 
Theodore Slotkin, a scientist at the Duke University Medical Center, published dozens of papers 
MCGARITY & WAGNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:58 PM 
1736  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1719 
Several environmental and public health groups had filed a lawsuit 
in 2007 asking the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to order EPA to 
come to a decision on their longstanding petition to cancel the 
remaining registrations for chlorpyrifos and to withdraw the 
“tolerances” that it had established setting permissible levels of 
chlorpyrifos on food crops.76 After EPA studied the matter for another 
seven years, the court ordered it to respond to the petition by the end 
of October 2015.77 On October 28, 2015, EPA, working under President 
Obama, proposed to revoke all of the tolerances for chlorpyrifos, 
having concluded that the existing scientific information did not 
support a conclusion, required by the 1996 Food Quality Protection 
Act (“FQPA”), that aggregate exposures to that pesticide from food 
and drinking water at the existing tolerances presented a “reasonable 
certainty [of] no harm” to human beings.78 The statute in fact required 
EPA to pay special attention to the risks that pesticides posed to 
fetuses, infants, and children by employing an additional safety factor 
to ensure that they would not be harmed by aggregate exposures to 
pesticides.79 In support of its assessment, EPA cited “a considerable 
and still-growing body of literature on the effects of chlorpyrifos on the 
developing brain of laboratory animals (rats and mice) indicating that 
gestational and/or postnatal exposure may cause persistent behavioral 
effects into adulthood.”80 The proposal noted the uncertainties that 
epidemiological studies encountered in obtaining accurate exposure 
measures and in controlling for confounding factors.81 The Agency 
 
detailing the effects of chlorpyrifos on very young rats. He observed a clear cause–effect 
relationship between exposure and structural abnormalities, behavioral problems, and impaired 
cognitive function. Even at “exquisitely low doses,” the chemical prevented cells from dividing 
properly. Rabin, supra note 64. 
 76. Chlorpyrifos; Tolerance Revocations, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,080, 69,083 (Nov. 6, 2015) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180). 
 77. In re Pesticide Action Network of N. Am. v. EPA, 798 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 78. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012); 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,080. For food uses, the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act incorporates the Food Quality Protection 
Act’s “reasonable certainty [of] no harm” test for determining whether to allow a pesticide’s 
registration to remain in effect. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb); see League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A tolerance qualifies as safe if the Administrator has 
determined that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure 
to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
 79. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C). 
 80. 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,090. Although there was some variability among the studies, 
“behavioral changes of some sort were reported in most studies.” Id. 
 81. Id. at 69,091. 
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concluded, however, that the studies presented “evidence of delays in 
mental development in infants (24–36 months), attention problems and 
autism spectrum disorder in early childhood, and intelligence 
decrements in school age children who were exposed to chlorpyrifos or 
OPs during gestation.”82 Given the uncertainties, the agency elected to 
apply the full statutory ten-fold additional safety factor to protect 
children.83 EPA’s pesticide Scientific Advisory Panel (“SAP”) agreed 
with this assessment.84 And dozens of scientists, doctors, and public 
health professionals also supported the proposal.85 
The court granted extensions until March 2017 to finalize the 
proposal, but made it clear to the Obama administration that no 
further extensions would be forthcoming.86 At this point, Dow 
employed a “science-for-hire” consulting company to conduct further 
studies on chlorpyrifos and to deconstruct the new epidemiological 
studies.87 The consultants demanded that Professor Rauh allow them 
and EPA to examine the medical records of the subjects of the 
Columbia study so that they could determine the validity of her 
statistics. She declined on the ground that access to the data would 
allow the company to determine the identities of the subjects and their 
medical histories, a revelation that would violate her team’s promise to 
protect their privacy.88 She was willing to let EPA see the raw data, but 
she was unwilling to let Dow’s consultants invade the privacy of her 
subjects.89 After meeting with Rauh and her team in 2014 to discuss 
questions they had about the study, the EPA’s scientists were satisfied 
that they did not need to examine the original files for the subjects.90 
 
 82. Id. at 69,093. 
 83. Id. at 69,095. 
 84. Id. at 69,090. 
 85. Brady Dennis, Trump EPA Declines to Ban Pesticide that Obama had Proposed 
Outlawing, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environ
ment/wp/2017/03/29/trump-epa-declines-to-ban-pesticide-that-obama-had-proposed-outlawing 
[https://perma.cc/HA3G-9AEA]. 
 86. In re Pesticide Action Network of N. Am. v. EPA, 840 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Chlorpyrifos; Tolerance Revocations; Notice of Data Availability and Request for Comment, 81 
Fed. Reg. 81,049, 81,0151 (proposed Nov. 17, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180). 
 87. Lerner, supra note 64. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Corbin Hiar, Agency Follows Industry Playbook to Attack Science, E&E NEWS (Aug. 23, 
2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060095095 [https://perma.cc/SY6T-SFLE]; Lerner, supra 
note 64.  
 90. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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In November 2016, EPA published a notice stating that it had 
reevaluated the risk assessment underlying the 2015 proposed 
revocation in light of comments from the SAP.91 It agreed with the 
panel that the Columbia study was scientifically reliable and that it 
should not rely on that study’s cord blood data as the point of departure 
for determining a level of exposure that would give rise to a reasonable 
certainty of no harm.92 At the SAP’s suggestion, EPA reestimated peak 
exposures in a new risk assessment, which ultimately demonstrated 
that chlorpyrifos exposures from food and drinking water at the 
existing tolerances did not meet the statute’s “reasonable certainty [of] 
no harm” test.93 The Agency invited further public comment on the 
revised risk assessment.94 
After the 2016 election, Dow was in an ideal position to influence 
upper-level decisionmakers at EPA. One of its lobbyists served on the 
EPA transition team, which was headed by an employee of a think tank 
that had received monetary support from Dow.95 And President Trump 
appointed Dow’s CEO, Andrew Liveris, to be the head of an advisory 
committee for the Department of Commerce (“DOC”) called the 
American Manufacturing Council.96 
Several days after a private meeting with Liveris, EPA 
Administrator Pruitt formally denied all aspects of the environmental 
groups’ petition.97 Pruitt decided to ignore the many studies showing 
developmental neurotoxicity at exposure levels lower than the existing 
tolerances because the issue of the neurodevelopmental toxicity of 
organophospate pesticides “was, and remains, an issue at the cutting 
edge of science, involving significant uncertainties.”98 The industry 
comments on the 2015 proposal demonstrated “deep disagreement” 
over how the recent animal and epidemiological studies “should be 
considered in the EPA’s risk assessment.”99 Pruitt therefore concluded 
 
 91. 81 Fed. Reg. 81,049. 
 92. Id. at 81,050. 
 93. Id. at 81,051. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Chlorpyrifos; Order Denying PANNA and NRDC’s Petition to Revoke Tolerances, 
82 Fed. Reg. 16,581, 16,583 (Apr. 5, 2017); Pruitt Met with Dow CEO Before Rejecting Pesticide 
Ban, E&E NEWS (June 28, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/06/28/stories
/1060056731 [https://perma.cc/QT5Y-2DW7] (meeting with Liveris). 
 98. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 16,590. 
 99. Id. 
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that “the science on this question is not resolved and would likely 
benefit from additional inquiry.”100 In addition, Pruitt thought that it 
might be advisable to “seek additional authoritative peer review” of 
the EPA’s risk assessment before finalizing it.101 Although the benefits 
of the pesticide were irrelevant under the FQPA, Pruitt nevertheless 
thought it was “important to recognize that for many decades 
chlorpyrifos has been and remains one of the most widely used 
pesticides in the United States.”102 Pruitt thus decided to deny the 
petitions and continue to study chlorpyrifos until the next 
reregistration deadline in 2022.103 
In a statement for the press, Pruitt explained that the Trump 
administration was “returning to using sound science in decision-
making – rather than predetermined results.”104 In reality, however, he 
was doing just the opposite, and he was doing so in violation of the 
statute under which he was acting. Documents produced in response to 
a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request showed that Pruitt’s 
political staff had pressured the agency’s scientific staff to write a final 
regulation supporting Pruitt’s predetermined conclusion that the 
chlorpyrifos tolerances should remain in effect.105 The recently retired 
head of EPA’s chemical safety unit observed that Pruitt and his 
politically appointed underlings were “ignoring the science that is 
pretty solid,” and he predicted that farm workers and their children 
would be put at risk for at least another four years.106 
In August 2018, the Ninth Circuit vacated Pruitt’s action and 
ordered EPA to “revoke all tolerances and cancel all registrations for 
chlorpyrifos within 60 days.”107 Contrary to Pruitt’s statements about 
using sound science to support his decision, the court found that EPA 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. Since EPA had already canceled the pesticide registrations for chlorpyrifos home 
uses, withdrawing the tolerances for all of its food uses would have the practical effect of removing 
it from the market. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Eric Lipton, E.P.A. Chief Won’t Ban Insecticide Thought To Be Risky, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
30, 2017, at A21. 
 105. Eric Lipton & Roni Caryn Rabin, In Memos, E.P.A. Vowed New Day, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
19, 2017, at A13. 
 106. Lipton, supra note 104; New EPA Rule Puts Some Kids at Autism Risk, E&E NEWS (Apr. 
4, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/04/04/stories/1060052559 [https://perma.cc/
ZG9X-HGVY] (noting that the rule “could affect the mostly Hispanic children of undocumented 
immigrants who live near the farms where they work to pick the pesticide-covered produce”). 
 107. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 832 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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did not even attempt to defend the denial of the petition on its scientific 
merits.108 Instead, it relied on procedural and jurisdictional arguments, 
which the court rejected.109 Professor Dan Farber observed that 
“Pruitt’s invocation of ‘sound science’ as a way of ignoring all the 
scientific evidence shows the hollowness of that anti-regulatory buzz 
phrase.”110 
5. Rewriting Reports Relevant to Regulatory Issues.  Agencies often 
draft or commission reports on scientific issues that they later rely upon 
in setting agency priorities or in regulatory initiatives addressed to 
particular products or activities. Because such reports do not always 
receive widespread public attention (and sometimes cannot even be 
reached with FOIA requests),111 agency leaders can advance 
deregulatory policies by manipulating the science that goes into those 
reports.112 Having altered the scientific record, the policies are much 
easier to justify. 
The oil and gas industry was undoubtedly pleased by a long-
awaited draft report on the environmental risks posed by hydraulic 
fracturing (“fracking”) technologies that EPA published in June 2015 
under President Obama.113 The report’s bottom line conclusion was 
that while there were “specific instances where one or more 
mechanisms led to impacts on drinking water resources,” the existing 
studies did not indicate “widespread, systemic impacts on drinking 
 
 108. See id. at 828. 
 109. See id. at 829. 
 110. See Dan Farber, Trump Loses Another Big Court Case, LEGALPLANET (Aug. 13, 2018), 
http://legal-planet.org/2018/08/13/trump-loses-another-big-court-case [https://perma.cc/UHM3-
ZGES].  
 111. WENDY WAGNER, REPORT FOR ACUS: SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF 
AGENCY DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 116–18 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/N5MX-PHEV] [hereinafter WAGNER, ACUS STUDY]. 
 112. Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 696 (stating that public officials have “manipulated 
scientific reports to help justify policy decisions”). For example, the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality demanded such extensive changes in the chapter describing 
anthropogenic climate change in EPA’s 2003 report on the state of the environment that then-
EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman decided to delete the chapter, rather than attempt 
to defend it from the “severe criticism” that it would attract from the scientific community. 
Andrew C. Revkin & Katherine Q. Seelye, White House Cuts Data on Warming in an E.P.A. 
Report, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at A1 
 113. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES (External Review Draft 
2015), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid=244651 [https://perma.cc/T28M-
9B5S]. 
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water resources in the United States.”114 The industry and its allies in 
Congress seized on the conclusion to support their contention that 
fracking did not result in contaminated drinking water and therefore 
did not need to be regulated by either EPA or the states.115 
Environmental groups were mystified, because the body of the 
report—which spotlighted many instances in which fracking operations 
had in fact contaminated groundwater—did not seem to support its 
upbeat conclusion.116 FOIA requests from news organizations later 
revealed that the conclusion that fracking did not have “widespread 
systemic” impacts on drinking water did not appear in the draft that 
EPA scientists sent to the White House for interagency review.117 
Instead, the draft had emphasized the fact that fracking had 
contaminated drinking water in more than twenty instances in support 
of its conclusion that EPA had identified “potential vulnerabilities” of 
drinking water supplies to fracking.118 The conclusion regarding a lack 
of “widespread systemic” effects did not appear in the report until after 
several meetings between EPA officials, White House staff and high-
level officials in the Department of Energy (“DOE”) and DOI.119 A 
former EPA official believed that the “widespread systemic” effects 
statement was inserted by political appointees “to ensure that there 
would not be blowback from the oil and gas industry.”120 
 
 114. Ellen M. Gilmer & Mike Soraghan, EPA Study Finds No “Widespread” Impact on 
Drinking Water, E&E NEWS (June 4, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060019689 
[https://perma.cc/94CZ-ZS7G]. 
 115. Ellen M. Gilmer, Enviros Conflicted After Study Finds Contamination Not Widespread, 
E&E NEWS (June 5, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2015/06/05/stories/1060019713 
[https://perma.cc/Q4CA-YQRY] [hereinafter Gilmer, Enviros Conflicted]; Ellen M. Gilmer, 
Lawmakers Spar Over EPA Study’s Bottom Line, E&E NEWS (June 4, 2015), https://www.ee
news.net/eenewspm/2015/06/04/stories/1060019698 [https://perma.cc/3FZ8-MRJN]; Myra P. 
Saefong, Why Shale Producers Are Happy With this EPA Fracking Study, MARKETWATCH (June 
11, 2015), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/shale-producers-are-thrilled-with-this-epa-frack
ing-study-2015-06-11 [https://perma.cc/8BLP-49SC]. 
 116. Ellen M. Gilmer, Enviros Conflicted, supra note 115.  
 117. Tom Scheck & Scott Tong, EPA’s Late Changes to Fracking Study Downplayed Risk of 
Polluted Drinking Water, APM REPORTS (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/
2016/11/29/world/epa-s-late-changes-fracking-study-portray-lower-pollution-risk [https:// 
perma.cc/86TN-EMX2]; Mike Soraghan, White House Engaged in “Messaging” for EPA Fracking 
Study, E&E News (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060043152 [https:// 
perma.cc/E4LV-HHVP]. 
 118. See text accompanying supra note 117. 
 119. See text accompanying supra note 117. 
 120. Scheck & Tong, supra note 117 (quoting Dominic DiGiulio). After undertaking a 
detailed review of the draft report, a panel of the agency’s Science Advisory Board concluded 
that EPA had not “support[ed] quantitatively its conclusion about lack of evidence for 
widespread, systemic impacts on drinking water resources.” U.S. EPA SCI. ADVISORY BOARD, 
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During the Trump administration, politically appointed officials 
even more aggressively amended staff scientific reports. Internal 
documents obtained from the National Park Service (“NPS”) pursuant 
to a FOIA request showed that upper-level officials had deleted every 
reference to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions as a cause of 
climate change from a draft report on the risks that rising sea levels 
posed to national parks.121 At the insistence of political appointees in 
the White House, EPA’s staff removed passages highlighting the 
dangers posed by power plant carbon dioxide emissions from the 
regulatory impact assessment for the Trump administration’s proposed 
rollback of the Obama administration’s regulations addressing 
greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants.122 A Sierra Club 
FOIA request yielded documents showing that upper-level political 
appointees in the DOE changed a report being prepared by the 
National Energy Technology Laboratory on the January 2018 “bomb 
cyclone” cold wave to emphasize the benefits of coal-fired power 
plants in a misleading fashion.123 
 
 
SAB REVIEW OF THE EPA’S DRAFT ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES, 2, EPA-SAB-16-005 (Aug. 
2016). Because the data were insufficiently robust to support a quantitative analysis, EPA 
scientists deleted the “widespread systemic” conclusion from the final version of the report. U.S. 
EPA, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 
2016); Soraghan, supra note 117. The revised report found evidence that fracking contaminated 
drinking water at all stages of the process. Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Shifts on Fracking, Citing 
Harm to Water, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2016, at A19. 
 121. Elizabeth Shogren, Wipeout: Human Role in Climate Change Removed from Science 
Report, REVEAL (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.revealnews.org/article/wipeout-human-role-in-
climate-change-removed-from-science-report [https://perma.cc/4FF9-6CPG]. After the 
censorship was reported in the trade press, the department reinserted references to human-caused 
climate change in the final version of the report. Adam Aton, Researchers Say Sea-Level Report 
Was Censored. Here It Is, E&E NEWS (May 21, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060082165 
[https://perma.cc/2RAH-EKWS]. 
 122. Zack Colman & Maxine Joselow, White House Cut Climate Warnings from Rule on 
Power Plants, E&E NEWS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060095807 
[https://perma.cc/398K-ZZWF]; Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Dire Climate Change Warnings Cut from 
Trump Power-Plant Proposal, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Sept. 4, 2018, 3:06 PM), 
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/dire-climate-change-
warnings-cut-from-trump-power-plant-proposal [https://perma.cc/77YK-HS8T]. 
 123. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Trump Officials Helped Edit “Bomb Cyclone” Report to Boost Coal, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-
09/trump-officials-helped-edit-bomb-cyclone-report-to-boost-coal [https://perma.cc/MRH3-
MLJ4]. 
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6. Substituting Deregulatory Policy for Science.  Perhaps the most 
pervasive strategy for deregulation through science is for upper-level 
political appointees to quietly substitute deregulatory policy for 
science as they interact with staff scientists during the decisionmaking 
process. Political appointees in the White House can also substitute 
policy for science in nontransparent ways when agencies send drafts of 
regulations to OIRA for review. 
Upper-Level Agency Officials. Because the careers of staff 
scientists and engineers depend on the assessments of upper-level 
policymakers, they understandably feel pressure to accommodate the 
desires of their superiors. When the desires of upper-level officials 
conflict with professional norms, as, for example, when they suggest or 
demand that scientists select models or interpret data to achieve 
predetermined outcomes, it may be difficult for agency scientists and 
engineers to resist.124 Politically appointed officials have frequently 
overruled agency experts without providing credible reasons for doing 
so.125 One of the most striking examples this phenomenon is the history 
of EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for 
fine particulate matter (“PM”) during the George W. Bush 
administration. The administrator rejected a staff recommendation 
that the Agency tighten the standard,126 even though the Agency’s 
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (“CASAC”) had agreed with 
the staff’s recommendation.127 To support this less protective standard, 
 
 124. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1601, 1603–17 (2008) (noting that the deputy secretary of the interior interfered with the 
listing of and determination of critical habitat for several endangered species); 16 BNA, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORTER 1064 (1987) (noting that a career scientist 
who chaired OSHA’s working group dealing with employee exposure to lead was threatened with 
a letter charging her with insubordination if she did not write a provision that would relax the 
permissible level for lead in the battery manufacturing industry in accordance with the agency 
leadership’s policy preferences).  
 125. See Michael Hawthorne, EPA Chief Pruitt Overrules Staff, Gives Wisconsin’s Walker, 
Foxconn Big Break on Smog, CHI. TRIB. (May 2, 2018, 6:49 AM), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-smog-pruitt-foxconn-20180501-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/RV5G-A57B] (noting that EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt “exempted most of 
southeast Wisconsin from the latest federal limits on” air pollution, in order to benefit Foxconn’s 
planned $410 billion project for a new manufacturing facility in the area); ENDANGERED SPECIES 
COALITION, SUPPRESSED: HOW POLITICS DROWNED OUT SCIENCE FOR TEN ENDANGERED 
SPECIES 3 (2017) (reporting many instances during the Trump administration where the DOI’s 
Fish and Wildlife Service’s politically appointed leadership overruled its scientists “to please 
special interests”). 
 126. See EPA Coarse Particle Decision Sets Stage for Major Legal Battle, RISK POL’Y REP. 
(Sept. 26, 2006). 
 127. See EPA’s Particulate Rule Draws Only Criticism and Talk of Legal Challenge From All 
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some rather substantial meddling in the Agency’s analysis was 
necessary. Over the CASAC’s objections, EPA’s final analysis 
dropped several key studies and included edits and opinions that had 
not been internally reviewed.128 The Agency’s final analysis set aside 
the staff’s concern about short-term exposures as premature and 
unrealistic, and the studies supporting a short-term standard were 
discounted.129 The administration’s portrayal of these decisions as 
scientifically compelled sparked a sharp rebuke from the CASAC and 
the scientific community. Dr. Rogene Henderson, the CASAC 
chairwoman, told the press that most of the committee members were 
“very disappointed” that the Administrator had not followed the 
advice of the staff and the committee.130 Later, the committee sent a 
strongly worded letter to the Administrator, stating that EPA’s 
standard did not meet the statutory requirements131 and that, to the 
committee’s knowledge, “no science, medical or public health group” 
disagreed with CASAC’s assessment of the scientific record.132 The 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with several states and 
environmental groups that several of EPA’s conclusions deviated 
significantly enough from past agency practice, scientific advice 
(particularly by CASAC), and the scientific record that they warranted 
explanations, but EPA had provided none.133 
In preparing the regulatory impact assessment (“RIA”) detailing 
the costs and benefits of repealing the Obama administration’s Clean 
Power Plan (“CPP”), EPA’s upper-level decisionmakers determined 
that the RIA had overestimated the cobenefits of the reductions in PM 
emissions that would result from controlling CO2 emissions because it 
assumed that there was no level at which exposure to PM produced no 
adverse effects in human beings.134 Yet their decision ignored the many 
studies showing that PM exposures below the primary standard caused 
 
Around, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK. (Sept. 25, 2006). 
 128. Advisers Decide to Clarify Call to EPA For Stricter Standard on Fine Particles, 37 ENVTL. 
REP 285 (Feb. 10, 2006). 
 129. See Robert A. Michaels, Particulate Matter: The Marines, EPA, and Air Quality, 11 RISK 
POL’Y REP. 34 (2004).  
 130. Janet Wilson, New EPA Rules on Soot and Dust Set, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at B1. 
 131. Advisory Panel Warns of Continued Risk Because of EPA’s Decision on Fine Particles, 
37 ENVTL. REP. 2031 (Oct. 6, 2006). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n. v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 521–23 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 134. Niina Heikkinen, To Kill Climate Rule, EPA Wants to Redefine Danger of Soot, E&E 
NEWS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060092763 [https://perma.cc/V94R-
QEBR]. 
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adverse health effects in human beings.135 Indeed, two EPA scientists 
were coauthors of a study published in the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences in September 2018 showing that the mortality risk 
of PM exposures at levels below the primary NAAQS was much higher 
than previous studies suggested.136 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The literature on 
centralized review of federal agency rulemaking is filled with examples 
of officials in OIRA (an agency in the White House’s OMB) 
substituting deregulatory policy for agency scientific conclusions.137 
During the Reagan administration, OIRA made numerous, 
nontransparent technical changes to EPA’s high-level radioactive 
waste disposal rule and its ambient air quality standards for PM and to 
OSHA’s occupational health and safety standards for ethylene oxide, 
grain handling facilities and formaldehyde.138 President George H.W. 
Bush’s OIRA rejected an agreement among the OSHA staff, industry, 
and labor unions to lower the permissible exposure limit for 
formaldehyde139 and disputed OSHA scientists’ assessment of the risks 
to workers posed by cadmium.140 OIRA made a concerted effort during 
the George W. Bush administration to increase its technical and 
scientific capabilities in an attempt to gain deeper and broader control 
 
 135. Id.; see also Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: The Other Scientific Consensus The EPA is 
Bucking, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2017/10/11/the-energy-202-the-other-scientific-
consensus-the-epa-is-bucking/59dcff9230fb0468cea81e52/?utm_term=.4fe63051acb3 
[https://perma.cc/PG8L-JU58]. 
 136. Richard Burnett et al., Global Estimates of Mortality Associated with Long-Term 
Exposure to Outdoor Fine Particulate Matter, 115 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCIENCES 9592 (2018); see also Scott Waldman, EPA Staff Co-Wrote Study Linking Emissions to 
Death, E&E NEWS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060096863 [https://perma.cc/
86ZU-BJW3] (“As EPA rolls back emissions regulations, its own researchers are part of a major 
study that has found that global air pollution kills far more people than has previously been 
revealed.”). 
 137. See Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to 
Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (1986) (describing how OMB employees with 
little to no scientific background are making decisions that “involve scientific determinations”); 
Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of 
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 1, 64–73 (1984). 
 138. See generally Olson, supra note 137 (discussing EPA regulations); THOMAS O. 
MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 83–88, 89–92, 110–11 (1992) 
(describing changes made to OSHA health and safety standards). 
 139. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 159–60. 
 140. Id. at 168. 
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over the substance of agency rules.141 The OIRA staff used this 
expanded authority quite aggressively to force EPA to drop a proposed 
stringent secondary ambient air quality standard to protect crops from 
photochemical oxidants, even though the agency’s CASAC had 
recommended an even more stringent standard.142 EPA’s outraged 
staff, who hastily rewrote the regulation’s preamble to justify the 
change, called the change a matter of “pure politics.”143 The CASAC’s 
chairwoman testified in a subsequent congressional hearing that 
“[w]ilful ignorance” had “triumphed over sound science” in EPA’s 
decisionmaking process.144 Ultimately, OIRA substituted deregulatory 
policy for science in a number of other rulemaking initiatives during 
the George W. Bush administration.145 
OIRA’s aggressive interventions into agency rulemakings 
continued into the Obama administration.146 For example, the 
proposed regulations governing the disposal of coal combustion 
residuals (“CCRs” or “coal ash”) that EPA forwarded to OIRA in 
October 2009 would have characterized CCRs as hazardous wastes 
subject to the stringent requirements of Subtitle C of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act.147 It based that determination on the 
potential for toxic constituents to migrate from impoundments into 
groundwater and on the need to avoid catastrophic spills.148 The OIRA 
 
 141. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the Regulatory 
State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 968–69 (2005). 
 142. Erik Stokstad, EPA Adjusts a Smog Standard to White House Preference, 319 SCIENCE 
1602–03 (2008); Juliet Eilperin, Ozone Rules Weakened at Bush’s Behest, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/13/AR2008031304175.ht
ml?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/5E2W-KEGW]; see ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR OZONE: 
POLICY ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 8-13, 8-25 (2007) (outlining 
recent CASAC recommendations). 
 143. John Sullivan, Tom Avril & John Shiffman, Politics Choke Clean-Air Efforts, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/homepage/20081210_Scientists
_criticize_EPA_chief.html [https://perma.cc/2SUK-ZJ96]. 
 144. EPA’s New Ozone Standards: Hearing Before the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 87 (2008) (statement of Rogene F. Henderson, Chairman, 
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee). The D.C. Circuit later struck down the secondary 
standard because EPA’s justification for it was inadequate, but the court did not mention OIRA’s 
role. Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1358–62 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 145. Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with 
Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2041–42 (2015) 
 146. Id. at 2042–45. 
 147. Charlotte E. Tucker, Original Draft Shows Coal-Ash Proposal Substantially Revised 
During OMB Review, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1061 (2010). 
 148. Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 
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staff radically changed the content of the draft to provide a set of 
options that included hazardous waste listing, but also contained two 
far less stringent options.149 The draft RIA that emerged from OIRA 
focused heavily on the “stigma” effects that listing CCRs as hazardous 
wastes would have on the markets for recycling CCRs into concrete 
and wallboard.150 Although EPA’s draft of the RIA did not attempt to 
quantify the stigma effect, the OIRA version estimated that the stigma 
affect alone would cost society $233.5 billion in lost recycled CCRs, 
based on its unsupported assumption that 51 percent of the market for 
recyclable CCRs would disappear.151 Not surprisingly, the final coal ash 
regulations that EPA published in April 2014 did not characterize 
CCRs as hazardous wastes, even though the staff had by then identified 
at least 157 coal ash impoundments that had contaminated 
groundwater or otherwise posed a substantial risk to health or the 
environment.152 Instead of a federal regulatory program, the 
regulations suggested minimum criteria for states to use in their waste 
disposal programs, if they were so inclined.153 
B. Adjusting Internal Resources and Procedures 
Political appointees can delay or affect the outcomes of regulatory 
initiatives by adjusting internal agency procedures to make it more 
difficult for the staff to generate and use the science underlying those 
initiatives. They can accomplish this by forcing the staff through 
multiple time- and resource-consuming analytical exercises that are of 
marginal relevance to the agency’s statutory responsibilities, cutting 
the budgets and reducing the staff of the offices responsible for 
providing scientific and engineering input into regulatory initiatives, 
and changing organizational charts to render staff scientists and 
engineers subject to supervision by political appointees. Presidents and 
agency heads can also reduce the role that science plays in agency 
 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 260 (2012). 
 149. See id. at 261–62 (listing the options OIRA offered in its proposal); see also Tucker, supra 
note 147 (outlining the changes from the original EPA version to the OMB proposal). 
 150. See Steinzor, supra note 148, at 265–66. 
 151. Id.  
 152. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion 
Residuals from Electric Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,302, 21,302, 21,325–26 (Apr. 17, 2015) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261) (announcing that CCRs will be disposed of “as solid waste 
under subtitle D of RCRA [the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act],” rather than as 
hazardous waste); see also Joby Warrick, EPA Imposes Coal-Ash Curbs But Stops Short of 
‘Hazardous’ Designation, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2014, at A3. 
 153. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,303, 21,309. 
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decisions by reducing the resources available to agency scientists, 
making it more difficult for the staff to promulgate regulations, and 
arranging decisionmaking procedures to ensure that the work product 
of agency scientists is subject to review and modification by politically 
appointed officials. 
1. Cutting the Budgets for Technical Staff and Scientific Research.  
Perhaps the most straightforward way to ensure that agency scientists 
do not get in the way of deregulatory policy is simply to cut their 
budgets. It would seem far easier to downsize scientific staff by 
reducing the budget, rather than selecting out the most recalcitrant 
scientists and firing them outright. In subsequent years, the upper-level 
officials can, if necessary, seek increases in the budgets and bring in 
scientists more to their liking. And, in a similar vein, if an outside body 
like the agency’s Science Advisory Board produces a report that does 
not fit a deregulatory narrative, administrations can cut off funds for 
future reports.154 This strategy, of course, requires the cooperation of 
Congress, and Congress may be reluctant to cut back on popular 
regulatory programs. Even when unsuccessful, however, efforts by 
administrations bent on deregulation to cut agency science budgets 
sends a signal to government scientists that their contribution is not 
valued.155 
The Reagan White House was anxious to cut EPA’s research 
budget for the simple reason that, in the words of White House 
Counselor Edwin Meese, “all [research scientists] do is go out and find 
more problems that need to be solved.”156 After a panel of experts 
 
 154. See, e.g., Chris Mooney, Trump Wants to Slash Funds for the Outside Experts Who Make 
Sure EPA Gets the Science Right, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/04/04/trump-doesnt-just-want-to-cut-the-epas-
science-he-wants-to-cut-its-expertise/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.193486e80300 [https:// 
perma.cc/L3M2-BQCK]. There is very little evidence of attempts by OIRA to substitute 
deregulatory policy for science during the first two years of the Trump administration. 
 155. See Scott Waldman, Future Climate Scientists Concerned but Not Cowed by Trump, E&E 
NEWS (May 8, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060054161/search?keyword
=+Future+Climate+Scientists+Concerned+by+not+Cowed+by+Trump [https://perma.cc/UFE7-
9NTL] (discussing an interview with Christine McEntee, the CEO of the American Geophysical 
Union, wherein “[s]he said the Trump administration’s proposed cuts to climate research has sent 
a clear signal to scientists that their work is no longer valuable to the White House”). 
 156. ANNE M. BURFORD & JOHN GREENYA, ARE YOU TOUGH ENOUGH?:AN INSIDER’S 
VIEW OF WASHINGTON’S POWER POLITICS 80 (1986); see also DEVRA DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE 
RAN LIKE WATER 108 (2002) (describing a scientist’s interaction with an OMB examiner where 
the examiner responded to a request for funding by saying “Congress does not need to hear all 
these details”). For descriptions of agency budget cuts and their effects during the Reagan 
administration, see MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 
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assembled by the NAS reported in September 1981 that acid rain in the 
Northeast was probably caused by emissions of sulfur dioxide and 
oxides of nitrogen from power plants in the Midwest, the Reagan 
administration cut off federal funds for a second report that would have 
jointly reviewed the scientific information on acid rain with a panel of 
the Royal Society of Canada in the hopes of reaching a consensus on 
the relevant science for purposes of negotiating an acid rain treaty.157 
During President Reagan’s first term, funding for the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration also fell by 22 percent as a 
result of his budget request.158  Ultimately, more than a quarter of the 
agency’s skilled professionals departed159 and formal auto defect 
investigations fell from eleven per year to four.160 
The Trump administration launched another major assault on 
regulatory agency budgets that had the potential to reduce the 
agencies’ scientific capacity. Early on, the administration set a goal of 
reducing EPA’s staff by 20 percent through attrition, buyouts, and 
reductions in force.161 During the first nine months of Trump’s tenure, 
more than 700 employees retired or resigned, 200 of which were 
scientists.162 Work on climate change came to a virtual halt throughout 
the agency.163 In November 2017, DOI announced that it was closing 
the USGS’s Eastern Geographic Science Center in Reston, Virginia 
and reassigning its twenty-five employees or allowing them to retire.164 
The department cited cost savings as the reason for closing the facility, 
 
217 (1985); GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM?: REAGAN’S REGULATORY 
DILEMMA 204 (1984). 
 157. See Robert Reinhold, Acid Rain Issue Creates Stress Between Administration and Science 
Academy, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1982, at C1; Philip Shabecoff, U.S. Slashes Funds for Study on 
Utilities’ Role in Acid Rain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1982, at B17. 
 158. JOHN B. JUDIS, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 151 (2000). 
 159. Jeannye Thornton & Clemens P. Work, Highway-Safety Agency Hits a Rough Road, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 2, 1983, at 68. 
 160. JUDIS, supra note 158, at 151; DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE 
POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN AMERICA 248–49 (Beard Books 2003) (1989); see also 
MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 63 (discussing the Reagan administration’s proposals 
to make steep cuts in the budget for health and safety standards development). 
 161. Workers Leave by the Hundreds After Trump Takes Office, E&E NEWS (Dec. 22, 2017) 
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060069773 [https://perma.cc/R7WX-YCPX]. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Workers Say Climate Work Quashed Under Pruitt, Trump, E&E NEWS (June 6, 
2017), https://www-eenews-net.proxy.lib.duke.edu/greenwire/stories/1060055596/search?key
word=epa [https://perma.cc/2ZM2-2CKV]. 
 164. Scott Streater & Rob Hotakainen, USGS Science Center in Va. Set to Close, E&E NEWS 
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www-eenews-net.proxy.lib.duke.edu/greenwire/stories/1060066503/search
?keyword=USGS+Science+Center+in+Va.+Set+to+Close [https://perma.cc/TB7R-UVFG]. 
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which conducted research on geography, remote sensing, biology and 
computer science as they related to land use and climate change.165 At 
the same time that his administration was making these cuts, President 
Trump flouted his willingness to make decisions that should depend, to 
a great degree, on science without input from scientists.166 
More generally, the Trump administration’s Fiscal Year (“FY”) 
2018 budget would have slashed EPA’s overall budget by 31 percent 
and cut nearly all of the Agency’s budget for research on climate 
change.167 It would also have reduced appropriations for the operating 
costs of EPA’s Science Advisory Board by 84 percent and eliminated 
the interagency United States Global Change Research Program, 
which had recently received high praise from the NAS.168 It further 
proposed deep cuts in environmental monitoring, a critical scientific 
component of many EPA regulatory programs.169 The DOE’s program 
for sponsoring biological and environmental research would have 
declined 43 percent, and its program sponsoring renewable energy and 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, In the Trump Administration, Science is Unwelcome. So is 
Advice, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2018, at A1 [hereinafter In the Trump Administration]. 
 167. Niina Heikkinen, Former Staffers Decry “Draconian” Budget Cuts, E&E NEWS (Mar. 23, 
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perma.cc/GCG4-2XBP]; Stuart Parker, EPA Officials Defend Agency’s Duty to Follow Science 
on Climate Change, INSIDE EPA (May 2, 2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/epa-officials-
defend-agencys-duty-follow-science-climate-change [https://perma.cc/52K3-PQR5].  
 168. John H. Cushman, Jr., Federal Climate Research, Targeted for Elimination by Trump, 
Lauded by Scientists, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://insideclimate
news.org/news/12042017/climate-change-research-national-academies-sciences-global-warming-
donald-trump [https://perma.cc/LWW4-2XKE]; Heikkinen, supra note 167; Mooney, Trump 
Wants to Slash Funds for the Outside Experts Who Make Sure EPA Gets the Science Right, supra 
note 154. Perhaps sensing an impending exodus of highly qualified American climate scientists, 
French President Emmanuel Macron urged them to come to France, where they would be eligible 
for four-year grants of up to $1.7 million apiece to continue their work. Europe Tries to Lure 
Spooked U.S. Researchers, E&E NEWS (June 27, 2017), https://www-eenews-net.proxy.
lib.duke.edu/climatewire/stories/1060056603/search?keyword=Europe+Tries+to+Lure+Spooke
d+U.S.+Researchers [https://perma.cc/7QUX-M4VG]. By mid-2018, thirteen scientists from 
American universities had taken Macron up on his offer. U.S. Climate Scientists Flee to France, 
E&E NEWS (July 16, 2018), https://www-eenews-net.proxy.lib.duke.edu/climatewire/stories/
1060089121/search?keyword=U.S.+Climate+Scientists+Flee+to+France [https://perma.cc/P8UJ-
A3UJ]. 
 169. See Christopher Flavelle, If Trump Gets His Way, World May Not Know if U.S. 
Emissions Rise, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-
07/if-trump-gets-his-way-world-may-not-know-if-u-s-emissions-rise [https://perma.cc/ZYK3-
SQYB]; Annie Sneed, Trump Wants Deep Cuts in Environmental Monitoring, SCIENTIFIC AM. 
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-wants-deep-cuts-in-environ
mental-monitoring [https://perma.cc/J989-XPT5]. 
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energy efficiency would have suffered a 70 percent cut.170 The National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s research budget would 
have received a 22 percent cut, and its program for sponsoring research 
on how low-lying communities can adapt to rising sea levels would have 
been eliminated altogether.171 The USGS would have been cut by 20 
percent.172 NIOSH’s budget would have declined 40 percent, and all 
support for academic research would have been eliminated.173 In an op-
ed criticizing the budget cuts, three former EPA administrators who 
served during Republican administrations concluded that President 
Trump “ha[d] chosen ignorance over knowledge.”174 
It quickly became clear, however, that Congress was not buying 
into the Trump administration’s draconian proposals.175 At the end of 
the day, Congress left nearly all of the programs in place and reduced 
the budgets only modestly.176 Despite the congressional rejection of his 
first budget cuts, President Trump proposed similar cuts in his FY 2019 
budget proposal, but after the warring factions in Congress struck a 
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story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5be470ba9004 [https://perma.cc/MQK4-X9CE]. 
 175. See Marianne Lavelle, Congress to Pruitt: We’re Not Cutting EPA Budget to Trump’s 
Levels, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (June 15, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15062017/
scott-pruitt-epa-budget-hearing-congress-opposes-trump-cuts [https://perma.cc/PU36-GVNT]; 
Jeffrey Mervis & David Malakoff, House Lawmakers Balk at Most Trump Science Cuts in Early 
Bills, SCIENCE (June 30, 2017), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/06/house-lawmakers-balk-
most-trump-science-cuts-early-bills [https://perma.cc/EJ7T-666T]. 
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Here’s Why, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/trump-
government-spending-bill.html [https://perma.cc/XJH4-LH66]; Scott Waldman, Trump Seeks Big 
Cuts to Science Across Agencies, E&E NEWS (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www-eenews-
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budget deal that made more money available for 2019, science budgets 
did not suffer nearly as much as they had in the original proposal.177 
2. Changing Organizational Charts and Shifting Personnel.  
Politically appointed agency officials can enhance their ability to 
substitute policy for science by arranging agency decisionmaking 
procedures to give them multiple opportunities to review the work of 
the scientists. Early in the Reagan administration, OSHA head Thorne 
Auchter reorganized the agency’s procedures to establish a Regulation 
Review Committee composed of high-level political appointees, and 
he charged it with “reviewing documents and issues resulting from the 
standard development process.”178 Longtime OSHA staffers concluded 
that “the procedural quagmire that predictably resulted . . . reflected 
an undisguised desire of upper-level management to slow down the 
agency’s already ponderous internal rulemaking process.”179 
Moreover, by positioning appointees as the final step in “reviewing” 
the technical analyses, this new organizational chart seemed to provide 
a covert filter for translating the scientific record into policy in ways 
that were more favorable to the administration’s preferred policies. 
One of Administrator Lisa Jackson’s first actions after President 
Obama appointed her to head EPA was to limit the authorship of a 
critical “policy” summary of the technical literature for the NAAQS 
reviews solely to the technical staff.180 Previously, for this particular 
 
 177. See, e.g., Kevin Bogardus, Omnibus Would Keep Steady Funding, E&E NEWS (Mar. 22, 
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chopping-block-again [https://perma.cc/4KSZ-92AD]; Davis, supra note 176; Jeffrey Mervis, 
Congress Gives Science a Record Funding Boost, SCIENCE, Mar. 30, 2018, at 1447; Science Gets 
Modest Reprieve in Trump Budget, SCIENCE, Feb. 16, 2018, at 723; Waldman, supra note 176.  
 178. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 64. 
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 180. Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of 
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497 (2012); Andrew Childers, Jackson Reinstates EPA Staff Paper in Review of National Air 
Quality Standards, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1231 (2009); see Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, 
Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Elizabeth Craig, Acting Assistant Adm’r, Air & Radiation, 
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report, political officials could exert a heavy hand in “explaining” what 
the technical research revealed; now they would be excluded from 
participating in an effort to ensure that the staff’s assessment was as 
scientifically robust as possible.181 Jackson concluded that the previous 
arrangement “complicated and delayed the NAAQS development 
process and made it vulnerable to the introduction of policy options 
that are not supported by the relevant scientific information.”182 The 
head of the CASAC stated that the change represented “a strong 
reaffirmation of the importance of the science committee.”183 
Environmental groups also supported the action.184 Jackson further cut 
back some of the formal interagency consultation steps in EPA’s 
development of Integrated Risk Information System (“IRIS”) 
standards establishing target exposures for inhalation and ingestion of 
hazardous substances, and she required all interagency discussions to 
be made public.185 Jackson’s changed IRIS process underscored how 
extensively the previous process, developed during the George W. 
Bush administration, allowed for repeated interagency negotiations 
that both impeded rulemaking and led to secret adjustments to the 
agency’s underlying scientific assessments.186 
In early April 2018, President Trump signed a presidential 
memorandum ordering EPA to change several aspects of its 
implementation of the Clean Air Act.187 EPA responded by changing 
the procedures for establishing NAAQS one more time. Administrator 
Pruitt redirected the line of authority for the office conducting the 
analyses (the Office of Research and Development) from the agency’s 
science advisor to an office managed by a political appointee (the 
Office of Air and Radiation), a shift that marked a significant 
departure from the historic insulation of EPA’s Office of Research and 
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 187. Presidential Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,761, 16,761–62 (Apr. 12, 2018). 
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Development from political controls.188 Pruitt also directed the 
CASAC to begin offering advice on the adverse social, economic, and 
energy impacts of the standards as well as the science underlying the 
standards and to focus more specifically on the relative contributions 
of natural and anthropogenic activities when it reviewed the NAAQS, 
the implication being that EPA would not have to tighten NAAQS to 
the extent that natural phenomena caused emissions of the relevant 
pollutant.189 The memo further directed the staff to focus more heavily 
on the possibility of thresholds and background levels of the criteria 
pollutants “for context.”190 Environmental groups and legal scholars 
criticized the memo as a backdoor way to allow the agency to consider 
cost in setting NAAQS, despite a unanimous Supreme Court holding 
that cost was not a relevant consideration at the standard-setting 
stage.191 
Political appointees can also sideline agency scientists by 
reassigning them to meaningless positions.192 Complaining that “‘30 
percent of the crew [at the DOI]’ was not ‘loyal to the flag,’”193 
Secretary Ryan Zinke appointed a board of political appointees to 
reassign members of the department’s 227 senior executive service 
employees to new positions.194 In what became known around the 
department as the “Thursday-night massacre,” the board reassigned 
twenty-seven scientists and technical experts from jobs in which they 
were using their skills to protect the nation’s natural resources to jobs 
where, in many cases, their expertise was not needed.195 Several of the 
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ED7D-ZJD4]. A spokeswoman for the American Federation of Government Employees noted 
that civil service employees swore an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the United States, 
not to a political party. Id. 
 194. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR 
EXECUTIVES AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 9 (2018). 
 195. Adam Federman, The Plot to Loot American’s Wilderness: A Little-Known Bureaucrat 
MCGARITY & WAGNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:58 PM 
2019] STEALTH “SCIENCE” STRATEGIES 1755 
reassigned specialists believed that their reassignments were related to 
the fact that they were working in the areas of climate change, energy, 
and resource conservation.196 One of them, Joel Clement, protested his 
reassignment in an op-ed in the Washington Post and a formal 
whistleblower complaint against the department.197 Clement was an 
expert in forest ecology and had worked in the department for seven 
years on issues at the intersection of climate science and public lands.198 
At the time of the reassignment, he was serving as the director of the 
department’s Office of Policy Analysis where he was responsible for 
the department’s efforts to address climate change resiliency in the 
Arctic.199 He was reassigned to a position in the department’s 
accounting office where he was supposed to be in charge of employees 
auditing royalty payments.200 Clement admitted that he was wholly 
unqualified for his new position, and his new boss confirmed that the 
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Counsel (July 12, 2017) [hereinafter Clement Complaint]. 
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office to which he was reassigned had no need for an employee with his 
expertise.201 
Clement believed that he was reassigned to a position for which 
he was unqualified because the department’s political leaders did not 
agree with the scientific consensus amongst the department’s experts: 
that global warming was a serious enough problem to warrant the 
assistance that Clement’s group had been providing to Native villages 
in Alaska where “the land upon which citizens’ homes and schools 
stand is newly vulnerable to storms, floods, and waves.”202 He further 
concluded that he was being punished for bringing the plight of the 
Native villagers to the attention of White House officials and, later, to 
the international community at recent conferences.203 Noting that other 
DOI experts were also “being sidelined,”204 he argued that Secretary 
Zinke’s promise to reduce the department’s staff through 
“reassignment” assumed that reassigning professionals to positions in 
which their talents were irrelevant would induce them to resign.205 
Clement himself resigned in October 2017.206 
C. Changing the Rules for Scientific Deliberations 
A final tactic, which is gaining considerable momentum under the 
Trump administration, is to alter the procedural rules within the agency 
for conducting the technical analysis and peer review of scientific 
information. Existing rules for more open-ended, scientifically 
grounded practices can be altered in ways that lead to more politically 
desirable outcomes by: stacking scientific advisory committees, 
altering the role of expert peer review panels or, even more invasively, 
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dictating how agency staffers are allowed to consider and use evidence 
in their technical analyses. Each is considered in turn. 
1. Marginalizing External Review of Agency Science.  Since 
scientific peer review is intended to ensure the reliability of the staff 
assessments, one way to move the science underlying regulation 
toward more deregulatory ends is to manipulate or marginalize outside 
advisory committees. 
At first blush, the mammoth size of this “fifth branch” of science 
advisors seems to limit the ability of a new administration to alter or 
adjust their role.207 The federal government has created more than 200 
scientific advisory committees consisting of outside experts from 
academia, industry and public interest groups to advise federal 
agencies on how to bring scientific and technical information to bear 
on pressing issues at the intersection of science and policy.208 Agencies 
typically hire scientists and engineers with expertise in the kind of 
scientific issues they address. But scientific advisory committees allow 
them to draw on the expertise of highly credentialed researchers who 
frequently hold prestigious positions in major universities, 
corporations and other nongovernmental organizations. Serving 
without pay or with modest stipends, these prestigious scientists and 
engineers “provide an important vehicle for providing decisionmakers 
with robust, professional, and up-to-date scientific advice.”209 Scientific 
advisory committees also provide a valuable educational function 
because they “provide a transparent and objective eye that helps the 
public know when the government is making sound, science-based 
decisions.”210 And the objectivity of their advice allows the public to 
hold agency leaders accountable when they base their decisions on 
policies that run contrary to agency authorizing statutes.211 
To the extent these that advisory committees do not have a 
statutory basis, however, agency leaders can simply disband 
committees that offer advice that runs contrary to their deregulatory 
 
 207. SHEILA JASANOFF, Judgment Under Siege: The Three-Body Problem of Expert 
Legitimacy, in SCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASON 151, 157–59 (2012).  
 208. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, ABANDONING SCIENCE ADVICE 3 (2018), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/01/abandoning-science-advice-full-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4B2-E87P]. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 4. 
 211. Id. 
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policy preferences.212 After the National Human Research Protections 
Advisory Committee of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) and its Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing 
attracted opposition from religious groups during the George W. Bush 
administration, upper-level officials in the department simply 
abolished them.213 During the Trump administration, Interior 
Secretary Zinke allowed DOI’s Advisory Committee on Climate 
Change and Natural Resource Science to expire because the 
administration was not interested in advice about how to protect the 
nation’s natural resources from climate disruption.214 Similarly, Acting 
Administrator Andrew Wheeler in October 2018 disbanded two large 
advisory panels that the seven-person CASAC had relied on for more 
than thirty years to assist it in reviewing scientific documents that 
EPA’s staff prepared in connection with its five-year reviews of the 
NAAQS for PM, thereby depriving CASAC of the particularized 
expertise that it needed to do its job.215 
In agencies that rely heavily on scientific advisory committees, 
political appointees can also increase the probability that committees 
yield favorable assessments by purging them of scientists who are likely 
to provide unfavorable assessments and replacing them with scientists 
who are more likely to provide assessments that are consistent with 
their policy views.216 This strategy is best accomplished discreetly. As 
President Reagan learned, when “hit lists” of disfavored science 
advisors are revealed in Science magazine, they can generate a strong 
negative public reaction.217 
 
 212. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL 
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 187 (2008). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Michael Doyle & Brittany Patterson, Climate Advisory Group Died Quietly, E&E NEWS 
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060058869 [https://perma.cc/5D38-PL5N] 
(quoting former committee member Paul Beier, Northern Arizona University). 
 215. Sean Reilly, EPA Scraps Science Panel: “Your Service . . . Has Concluded,” E&E NEWS 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060102455 [https://perma.cc/PG4V-7MK6]; 
Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Disbands Review Panels for Some Federal Air Quality Standards, 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Oct. 12, 2018, 3:26 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/
environment-and-energy/epa-disbands-review-panels-for-some-federal-air-quality-standards-1 
[https://perma.cc/93YL-STN5]; see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 208, at 7 
(lamenting the FDA’s disbandment of its Food Advisory Committee, which had since 1992 
provided expert advice on food science, nutrition and food safety). 
 216. See Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 696 (noting that “[o]fficials chose science advisory 
committee members based on who they voted for rather than scientific credentials”). 
 217. Eliot Marshall, Hit List at EPA?, 219 SCIENCE 1303, 1303 (1983). 
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Observers of the George W. Bush administration witnessed 
several instances of attempts to stack advisory committees with 
members that were sympathetic to administration positions.218 For 
example, HHS completely revamped the twenty-four-member Board 
of Scientific Counselors of the National Center for Environmental 
Health (“BOSC”), an agency that conducts research on the effects of 
environmental contaminants on human health and provides advice and 
support to state, federal and international agencies on environmental 
health issues.219 Several of the new appointees were well known for 
their connections to the chemical industry.220 At the same time, HHS 
removed a prominent researcher at Johns Hopkins University who had 
in the past helped environmental groups in regulatory matters.221 A 
spokesperson for HHS defended the Department’s “prerogative to 
hear preferentially from experts who share the president’s 
philosophical sensibilities.”222 
However, the EPA’s “hit list” under President Reagan and the 
stacking of science advisory panels under President George W. Bush 
look quaint compared to the techniques used in the Trump 
administration to gain greater political control over the scientific 
advisory process. Whether these new tactics actually help to move 
agency decisions in a more deregulatory direction remains an open 
question.223 Still, the tactics are sufficiently dramatic that they have the 
 
 218. See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 212, at 186 (describing an “epidemic of stacking” 
advisory committees during the George W. Bush Administration, and noting that public criticism 
of the practice did not deter the administration); Robert Steinbrook, Science, Politics, and Federal 
Advisory Committees, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1454, 1456 (2004) (criticizing the George W. Bush 
administration for stacking science advisory committees). 
 219. About NCEH, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH, http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/Information/
about.htm [https://perma.cc/AAW7-M3RM]; Weiss, HHS Seeks Science Advice to Match Bush 
Views, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2002, at A1. 
 220. Dan Ferber, Critics See a Tilt in a CDC Science Panel, 297 SCIENCE 1456, 1457 (2002). 
One new committee member, Dennis Paustenbach, had over the years testified on dozens of 
occasions for chemical industry defendants in toxic tort litigation. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 219, 
at A9. 
 221. Ferber, supra note 220, at 1457. 
 222. Weiss, supra note 219, at A8; see also generally Chris Clarke, Bush’s Bizarre Science, 2 
EARTH ISLAND J. 36 (2003) (reporting on the Secretary of Health and Human Services allowing 
the expiration of terms of the existing members of FDA’s Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory 
Committee and replacing them with eleven members, four of which were anti-abortion 
advocates); Karen Tumulty, Jesus and the FDA, TIME, Oct. 14, 2002, at 26 (discussing the lack of 
credentials of one of the new committee members). 
 223. Scott Waldman, EPA Advisers Got Oil Funding for Studies Against Car Rule, E&E 
NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060078707 [https://perma.cc/5A8F-
NU5E] (discussing the EPA staff’s considerable record that anchors the deliberations). 
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potential to slow down agency decisionmaking, especially in situations 
where the agency is statutorily required to get feedback from advisory 
bodies. 
Three particularly noteworthy shifts in the use of science advisory 
boards taking place under the Trump administration are apparently 
intended to move the advisory apparatus in a more deregulatory 
direction: (1) altering the composition of the existing boards, (2) 
creating policies that make future boards more industry-friendly by 
eliminating experts, and (3) reducing scientific advisory board 
influence. 
Altering the Composition. Since science advisors typically have 
fixed terms, it might be expected that altering the composition of the 
boards would need to happen gradually and incrementally.224 The 
Trump administration, however, has devised ways around this 
challenge. First, in a break with tradition, the administration cleared 
out dozens of existing science advisors, either by refusing to renew 
their terms or by removing disfavored members whose terms had not 
expired.225 Within a few months, the Trump administration dispatched 
twelve of the eighteen members of the BOSC.226 Nine members were 
terminated before their terms were completed,227 and another five were 
not renewed after their terms had expired.228 In replacing these 
members, Administrator Pruitt tripled the number of industry 
representatives on the board.229 The numbers are startling. In early 
2017, 79 percent of the board’s members were academics and 6 percent 
 
 224. See, e.g., U.S. EPA SCI. ADVISORY BOARD, REORGANIZATION OF THE EPA SCIENCE 
ADVISORY BOARD (SAB) 3, EPA-SAB-04-001 (Nov. 2003) (discussing fixed terms). 
 225. Sean Reilly, 38 Science Advisers Get Pink Slips — Internal Email, E&E NEWS (June 20, 
2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/06/20/stories/1060056308 [https://perma.cc/B9UJ-
5W7H]. 
 226. Scott Waldman, Spokesman Defends Removal of 12 Scientists, E&E NEWS (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/05/09/stories/1060054232 [https://perma.cc/4ZJQ-
7D7Z]. 
 227. Georgina Gustin & Marianne Lavelle, EPA Strips One Science Board, While Likely 
Eyeing a Bigger Prize, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (May 12, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/08052017/epa-science-advisory-board-dismissed-scott-pruitt-donald-trump [https:// 
perma.cc/VRN3-SEV2]. The Chairwoman was also terminated after she criticized the 
termination of these other, valuable members. Kevin Bogardus, Pruitt Demotes Critic as He 
Remakes Science Boards, E&E NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060065333 
[https://perma.cc/PDM4-AYYN]. 
 228. Rachel Leven, Path of EPA Science Board Unclear Amid Upheaval, BLOOMBERG ENV’T 
(May 8, 2017), https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/path-of-epa-science-board-
unclear-amid-upheaval [https://perma.cc/FQ83-BAFX]. 
 229. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 208, at 5. 
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came from industry.230 By early 2018, only 50 percent of the members 
were academics and 23 percent came from industry.231 Fourteen of the 
new members either consulted for or worked directly for the fossil fuel 
and chemical industries.232 Administrator Pruitt’s office explained that 
“[t]he administrator believes we should have people on this board who 
understand the impact of regulations on the regulated community.”233 
Pruitt’s successor, Andrew Wheeler, replaced five of the CASAC’s 
seven members—most of whom had been academics—with employees 
of state and local agencies, and he appointed a consultant to the oil 
industry to be its chairman.234 
With dozens of open slots across many other science advisory 
boards available to fill, a number of academic scientists were replaced 
by industry professionals235 or by academics outside of the mainstream, 
like Dr. Robert Phalen, who believes that “[m]odern air is a little too 
clean for optimum health.”236 This had a predictable effect on the 
remaining academic scientists. With the changed composition of the 
committees and new chairpersons, the work apparently became less 
attractive to busy academic scientists. A few respected scientists 
declined to serve in the current administration and others resigned 
before their terms expired.237 
Novel Exclusions for Expert Service on Boards. Historically, 
scientists with financial connections to companies with a stake in 
relevant proceedings have been disfavored as members of science 
 
 230. Id. at 6, fig.4. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Elizabeth Shogren, Here Are 8 Ways Outgoing EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Suppressed 
Science, ALTERNET (July 7, 2018), https://www.alternet.org/here-are-8-ways-outgoing-epa-chief-
scott-pruitt-suppressed-science [https://perma.cc/D564-LDRC]. 
 233. Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Dismisses Members of Major Scientific Review Board, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 7, 2017) [hereinafter Davenport, E.P.A. Dismisses Members], https://www.ny
times.com/2017/05/07/us/politics/epa-dismisses-members-of-major-scientific-review-board.html 
[https://perma.cc/RKJ9-FWP2]. 
 234. Reilly, supra note 215. 
 235. Scott Waldman, Pruitt Signals an Embrace of Industry Researchers, E&E NEWS (Nov. 1, 
2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/11/01/stories/1060065271 [https://perma.cc/
N7LK-3XUF]. 
 236. Sean Reilly, New Adviser Suggested Clean Air’s ‘Not Good for the Children,’ E&E NEWS 
(Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/11/03/stories/1060065617 [https://perma.
cc/3W57-9MAB]. 
 237. Kevin Bogardus, Members of Science Subcommittee Resign in Protest, E&E NEWS (May 
12, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060054502/print [https://perma.cc/Y2ZK-AR2Q]; 
Corbin Hiar, 2 Greens Reject Invitations for Seats on EPA Advisory Panel, E&E NEWS (Mar. 30, 
2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/03/30/stories/1060077847 [https://perma.cc/V7XT-
7D2Q]. 
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advisory boards because of the potential conflict of interest.238 In a 
directive on science advisory board membership, Administrator Pruitt 
turned the conflict rules on their head. Industry-associated members 
were actively solicited to “diversify” the panels.239 By contrast, 
scientists with federal grants from EPA were precluded from serving. 
In the words of the directive, “no member of an EPA federal advisory 
committee [shall] be currently in receipt of EPA grants.”240 
Prohibiting service by scientists with federal grants is 
unprecedented in the history of science advisory boards and, to our 
knowledge, in the history of scientific peer review more generally. 
Rather than “strengthening” membership as the directive claims in the 
title, excluding talented grant recipients with intimate knowledge of 
the issues EPA must address is likely to have the opposite effect. One 
former science adviser and current professor at Johns Hopkins 
University observed that the policy will “exclud[e] a subset of the best 
and brightest minds in environmental science from participation in 
what should be the highest science advisory role in the country.”241 
The directive will affect the composition of future panels, but the 
agency leadership is also using it to purge boards of existing members 
whose research is currently supported in part by EPA funding, thereby 
tipping future membership toward industry.242 Following the directive, 
agency managers have asked at least four academic science advisors to 
choose between continuing future service as advisors or leaving to 
 
 238. BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER, IMPROVING THE USE OF SCIENCE IN REGULATORY 
POLICY 19–23 (2009), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%
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perma.cc/G4TB-NLQZ]. The directive references diversifying representation. The 
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complete the work under their EPA scientific grants.243 Several chose 
the latter option.244 
Bypassing Existing Science Advisory Boards. Still another strategy 
for avoiding external review of regulatory decisions is benign neglect 
of statutorily mandated scientific advisory committees. The agency can 
cut the budgets for advisory committees or simply decline to schedule 
advisory committee meetings to review proposed agency actions. As 
noted earlier, during the first months of the Trump administration, the 
OMB proposed to cut the budget for EPA’s science advisors by 84 
percent.245 During the first year of the Trump administration, the 
number of scientific advisory committee meetings declined by 20 
percent from the last year of the Obama administration.246 According 
to a survey conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists (“UCS”), 
more than 65 percent of the chartered advisory committees in the 
FDA, EPA, and DOI failed to meet as often as their charters required 
in 2017.247 EPA failed to convene its Great Lakes Advisory Committee 
for over a year,248 and others were proceeding so slowly that their role 
was compromised or sidelined completely.249 
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NEWS (May 23, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/05/23/stories/1060082513 
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As they pursued their deregulatory agendas, these agencies were 
apparently not interested in what outside scientists had to say. For 
example, the National Parks System Advisory Board was established 
in 1935 to advise the NPS on issues related to the nation’s national 
parks, including in recent years how to mitigate the impacts of climate 
disruption on important natural and cultural sites.250 Based on a report 
by the advisory board’s science subcommittee, which was comprised of 
prominent scientists including a Nobel Prize winner and the president 
of Woods Hole,251 the director of the NPS issued a December 2016 
order calling for the staff to “[c]onduct and/or facilitate scientific and 
scholarly inquiry that is directly applicable to current or expected 
resource management challenges” and to incorporate the 
precautionary principle and adaptive management into its resource 
stewardship.252 Early in the Trump administration, however, Interior 
Secretary Zinke ordered the acting NPS director to rescind the order 
without consulting the advisory board, several members of which had 
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devoted many hours to crafting it.253 Although the Department’s press 
office elected to keep the public in the dark about the rescission, 
members of the board soon found out.254 One of them, Clemson 
University professor Gary Machlis, called the rescission an act of 
“willful ignorance” that was part of the Trump administration’s 
attempts to pull back any Obama administration actions having to do 
with climate change.255 Citing the “inexcusable” treatment the 
committee had received from the administration, nine of the twelve 
board members resigned to protest administration decisions that had 
ignored science and belittled DOI’s environmental responsibilities.256 
A department spokeswoman said that DOI “welcom[ed] their 
resignations.”257 
*   *   * 
The Good Science Rationale. In justifying these decisions, the 
Trump administration claims to be endeavoring to “strengthen” the 
quality of science at the agency.258 In rolling out the proposal barring 
scientific advisors from holding EPA grants, for example, 
Administrator Pruitt stated that “[w]hatever science comes out of 
EPA, shouldn’t be political science.”259 Yet records reveal that neither 
the agency’s mainstream scientists nor its staff were consulted in 
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an Obama administration ban on plastic water bottles in national parks. Eilperin, supra note 253. 
 256. Davenport, supra note 250. 
 257. Hotakainen, Zinke’s ‘Crazy Policies’, supra note 253. 
 258. See PRUITT, supra note 239. 
 259. Administrator Pruitt Issues Directive to Ensure Independence, Geographic Diversity & 
Integrity in EPA Science Committees, U.S. EPA (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/administrator-pruitt-issues-directive-ensure-independence-geographic-diversity 
[https://perma.cc/ZH4T-NMJL]. 
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developing this policy.260 A court order disclosing the underlying 
documents used to prepare the directive revealed that the policy was 
produced by Republican politicians working with representatives of 
various industries.261 Likewise, the agency leadership failed to consult 
with its staff or mainstream scientists in preparing its “transparency” 
proposal; even EPA’s own reconfigured BOSC “was left in the 
dark.”262 
Aftermath. These strategies for reorienting the external scientific 
review process in a more deregulatory direction have not gone 
unnoticed. Investigative journalists and reporters have been watching 
and reporting on the weekly and sometimes daily activities governing 
EPA’s use of science advisory boards.263 Members of scientific advisory 
committees have also spoken out in protest;264 members of Congress 
have requested reports from the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) and demanded information on scientific decisionmaking 
processes;265 and at least one House of Representatives hearing has 
been held on the Trump administration’s unique practices with respect 
 
 260. Sean Reilly, GOP Lawmakers, Industry Had EPA’s Ear on Advisory Panels, E&E NEWS 
(May 24, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060082657 [https://perma.cc/FT39-CRG8]. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Sylvia Carignan, Pruitt’s Science Advisers Left in the Dark on Transparency Proposal (2), 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 29, 2018, 11:36 AM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/
environment-and-energy/pruitts-science-advisers-left-in-the-dark-on-transparency-proposal-2 
[https://perma.cc/9QCB-6322]. 
 263. McGarity has collected a two-inch thick pile of news reports generated just on advisory 
boards at EPA over the last eighteen months.  
 264. Kevin Bogardus, Pruitt Demotes Critic as He Remakes Science Boards, E&E NEWS (Nov. 
1, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060065333 [https://perma.cc/A5LM-EK4H]; Niina 
Heikkinen, Lawyer Calls Pruitt’s Science Shake-up Illegal, E&E NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/11/08/stories/1060065927 [https://perma.cc/X294-
2THF]; Rodriguez, supra note 241. 
 265. Kevin Bogardus, Carper Sharply Questions Move on Scientific Advisers, E&E NEWS 
(May 9, 2017) https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060054267 [https://perma.cc/R4BY-DXZS]; Sylvia 
Carignan, EPA Science Advisers Defend Industry Ties, Despite Democrat Doubts, BLOOMBERG 
ENV’T (Jan. 10, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/epa-
science-advisers-defend-industry-ties-despite-democrat-doubts [https://perma.cc/H5L7-99EU]; 
Kyle Jahner, Sens. Ask GAO To Eye EPA’s ‘Double Standard’ on Advisers, LAW360 (Nov. 9, 
2017, 8:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/984025/sens-ask-gao-to-eye-epa-s-double-
standard-on-advisers [https://perma.cc/62V4-CR38]; Michael Phillis, EPA Science Board Moves 
Are Concerning, Dems’ Letter Says, LAW360 (May 19, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/926203/epa-science-board-moves-are-concerning-dems-letter-says [https://perma.cc/ 
A56K-2HR6]; Sean Reilly, Dems Tout Evidence of Political Meddling in Advisory Posts, E&E 
NEWS: E&E DAILY (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2018/
02/15/stories/1060073965 [https://perma.cc/N4T9-KQH9]; Sean Reilly, Lawmakers Urge Pruitt To 
Revise Policy on Science Advisers, E&E NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/
stories/1060065947 [https://perma.cc/3EM6-L7SX]. 
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to outside science advice at EPA.266 More House of Representatives 
hearings are likely in the 116th Congress as the Democratic leadership 
probes possible Trump administration abuses. A handful of lawsuits 
have also been filed by affected groups, including: the expert advisors 
themselves, the UCS, and the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(“NRDC”).267 Each of these groups has filed one or more separate 
lawsuits challenging the administration’s directive prohibiting 
members from holding EPA grants.268 Whether the courts will 
intervene into the Trump administration’s unprecedented assaults on 
the scientific advisory process remains to be seen. 
2. Constraining the Staff’s Analysis of the Best Available Science.  
In the past, career scientists have been relatively unconstrained in how 
they weigh the evidence or develop methods for assessing the relevant 
literature.269 In the last two years, however, the Trump administration 
has developed systemic policies to impose restrictions on how staff 
scientists analyze and synthesize the available scientific information. 
The most overt effort is EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt’s April 
2018 “Transparency Rule” proposal, which would exclude from 
consideration peer reviewed scientific studies if the authors do not 
make all of the underlying “dose response data and models . . . publicly 
available in a manner sufficient for independent validation.”270 If 
finalized, the rule is poised to operate as an enforceable exclusion on 
any research for which underlying data cannot be produced. The listed 
exceptions are limited to “privacy, confidentiality, confidential 
 
 266. Scott Waldman, EPA Science Board Purge To Play Role in Hearing, E&E NEWS (May 
22, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/05/22/stories/1060054864 [https://perma.cc/
VPQ7-LNF9].  
 267. Different lawsuits raise different objections. One case argues the EPA directive raises 
the bar too high for service in violation of FACA. Amanda Reilly, 2nd Lawsuit Hits Pruitt’s 
Advisory Board Directive, E&E NEWS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/stories/1060071815 [https://perma.cc/6NTD-ZH2B]. Other suits allege the directive 
violates the Administrative Procedure Act in multiple ways. Sean Reilly, NRDC Sues Pruitt Over 
Advisory Panel Mandate, E&E NEWS (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/
2018/01/25/stories/1060071971 [https://perma.cc/3ZUR-FBPV]; cf. Maria Hegstad, Critics Float 
Legal Theories to Challenge Pruitt’s Science Advisor Policy, INSIDE EPA (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://insideepa.com/daily-news/critics-float-legal-theories-challenge-pruitts-science-advisor-
policy [https://perma.cc/TS7N-WVSG] (highlighting potential legal strategies).  
 268. See text accompanying supra note 267. 
 269. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE EPA’S DRAFT IRIS ASSESSMENT 
OF FORMALDEHYDE 155 (2011).  
 270. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,768, 18,773 
(proposed Apr. 30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30) (emphasis omitted). 
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business information, and . . . national and homeland security,” which 
must be determined by the Administrator, presumably on a case-by-
case basis.271 Although transparency is generally a desirable scientific 
practice, the rule ignores the fact that scientists conducting the 
epidemiological studies that EPA relies upon in promulgating 
protective standards routinely promise their subjects to keep personal 
information confidential. As a result, “[t]he EPA rule creates a catch-
22 for these researchers. If they disclose the identity of their research 
subjects, then they could face criminal penalties under federal medical-
privacy laws. But if they respect the privacy of their subjects, then their 
final study cannot be used by EPA.”272 In fact, it appears that the 
primary purpose of the policy is to target these studies to ensure they 
are not allowed to be used in the EPA’s future analyses.273 The policy 
also appears to retroactively exclude all research that does not meet its 
test.274 For example, highly acclaimed studies on lead toxicity—like 
Herbert Needleman’s landmark paper,275 along with likely thousands 
of other studies that have been used in the past by EPA in support of 
regulatory standards—do not meet the proposal’s requirement for data 
transparency because, for example, 30-year-old records no longer exist. 
Although the EPA leadership argues that the prohibition will 
“strengthen” the quality of the agency’s science, the scientific 
community strongly disagrees. The editors of top scientific journals, 
including Science and Nature, observe that although transparency is 
critical to science, “in not every case can all data be fully shared.”276 
Rather, “it is paramount that the full suite of relevant science vetted 
through peer review, which includes ever more rigorous features, 
inform the landscape of decisionmaking.”277 By excluding some of the 
 
 271. Id. at 18,774. 
 272. Robinson Meyer, Even Geologists Hate the EPA’s New Science Rule, ATLANTIC (July 
17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/scott-pruitts-secret-science-rule-
could-still-become-law/565325 [https://perma.cc/H2NG-PU9X]. 
 273. Id. 
 274. 83 Fed. Reg. at 18,771 (“Agency’s offices should be guided by this policy to the maximum 
extent practicable during ongoing regulatory action, even where such research has already been 
generated, solicited, or obtained.”). 
 275. Herbert L. Needleman et al., Deficits in Psychologic and Classroom Performance of 
Children with Elevated Dentine Lead Levels, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 689 (1979) (finding 
compromised classroom performance among children with higher blood lead levels). 
 276. Jeremy Berg, Philip Campbell, Veronique Kiermer, Natasha Raikhel & Deborah Sweet, 
Letter, Joint Statement on EPA Proposed Rule and Public Availability of Data, SCIENCE MAG. 
(May 4, 2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6388/eaau0116 [https://perma.cc/P7JB-
ZVVF]. 
 277. Id. 
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most important and informative studies—studies that have been 
rigorously reviewed and rereviewed over time—the current 
administration will produce impoverished and incomplete records that 
in turn can be used to justify weakening protective standards and 
failing to strengthen weak standards. 
As if on cue, the DOI has recently published its own proposal for 
limiting the scientific evidence that its scientists may consider in much 
the same way as EPA’s transparency proposal.278 Politically motivated 
process rules that alter what and how science can be used by agency 
staffs at the earliest stages of technical deliberation are by far the most 
worrisome of the Trump administration’s recent innovations. It 
remains to be seen whether they will withstand the test of time. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The political manipulation of agency science appears widespread, 
but perhaps these interventions can be justified on the ground that they 
occur at the behest of a committed President eager to follow through 
on the public commitments he made during the election season. As 
long as the changes are made at the direction of an elected official, the 
argument goes, they line up with the basic principles of our 
constitutional democracy. Yet, even putting aside the hotly debated 
desirability of the President’s control of agency decisions through a 
unitary executive,279 most of the political manipulations of science 
detailed in Part I still fail basic tests of administrative legitimacy. 
First, the strategies discussed here are not transparent. Although 
they are advertised as efforts to “strengthen” the agency’s science and 
to use “good science” for regulation, they typically hide their 
substitution of policy preferences for rigorous scientific research from 
public view.280 When the manipulation is accomplished by 
presidentially appointed officials in the agencies or in OMB, the 
 
 278. See Dep’t of Interior, Order No. 3369, Promoting Open Science (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/so_3369_promoting_open_science.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W7YY-6LV9]; see also Michael Doyle, It’s No Secret: Dems Distrust New “Open 
Science” Policy, E&E News, Oct. 12, 2018, https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/10/
12/stories/1060102447 [https://perma.cc/9XW3-3TMW]. 
 279. For critical commentary on the unitary executive theory itself, see, e.g., HEIDI 
KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION (2015); Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: 
Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 360 
(2010). 
 280. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 241, 258–62. 
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president’s hand in the decisionmaking process is invisible. Even strong 
theories of executive power stop well short of suggesting that this type 
of scientific manipulation by political officials is appropriate. For 
example, then-Professor Kagan, a proponent of a strong executive 
branch, opined that political meddling in the underlying scientific 
record of agency rules is troubling, and stated that it “would threaten 
a kind of impartiality and objectivity in decisionmaking that conduces 
to both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the administrative 
process.”281 
Second, the strategies undermine the rigor and integrity of the 
scientific information that are the basics of agency regulations. As 
Professor Doremus notes, “[g]overnment cannot make good policy 
decisions unless the decision makers have access to, and appropriately 
use, the best available understanding of the relevant facts.”282 To the 
extent that the stealth science strategies described in Part I move 
agencies in the opposite direction, they compromise the objectivity of 
government decision making, pervert the public’s understanding of the 
reasons for agency decisions, and undermine the legitimacy of 
government action. 
Finally, the strategies have real world consequences. Substitution 
of deregulatory policy for science has, in the past, resulted in higher 
pollution loads and workplace exposures than Congress was willing to 
tolerate in the authorizing statutes.283 Although it is difficult to draw a 
direct line between manipulation of science and a particular death or 
injury, epidemiological studies like the “Six Cities” study strongly 
suggest less protective standards for PM will increase the number of 
adverse health effects in exposed populations.284 Likewise, existing 
epidemiological studies suggest that some children of farmworkers 
who continue to be exposed to chlorpyrifos will suffer neurological 
impairment.285 If EPA’s manipulation of a regulatory impact 
assessments to limit the indirect effects of reducing greenhouse gas 
 
 281. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2356–58 (2001) 
(urging self-restraint in White House review of agencies’ science-intensive rules). 
 282. Doremus, supra note 124, at 1639. 
 283. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.5. 
 284. See, e.g., Qian Di, Yan Wang, Antonella Zanobetti, Yun Wang, Petros Koutrakis, 
Christine Choirat, Francesca Dominici & Joel D. Schwartz, Air Pollution and Mortality in the 
Medicare Population, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2513, 2513 (2017) (“In the entire Medicare 
population, there was significant evidence of adverse effects related to exposure to PM2.5 and 
ozone at concentrations below current national standards.”). 
 285. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
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emissions from power plants successfully justifies the Trump 
administration’s drastic limitation of the scope of the Obama 
Administration’s greenhouse gas controls, we will all suffer from the 
effects of global warming to which the added emissions will contribute. 
To the extent that the political manipulation of science is a serious 
matter, then, why is it so prevalent? Should not the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the maze of good government laws and processes 
that are currently in place prevent this kind of political meddling? It is 
important to consider the limited reach of existing tools for 
discouraging political manipulation of science in the discussion that 
follows. As an initial matter, however, the reality of the unitary agency 
must be recognized—agencies engaged in health and environmental 
regulation typically operate as united, cohesive units of governance.286 
The current design of most internal agency decisionmaking processes 
provides few, if any, proactive barriers to prevent politically appointed 
officials from tinkering with the agency’s scientific record. Instead, the 
agency speaks with one voice to the public and the reviewing courts in 
a way that commingles the work of the technical staff with that of the 
political appointees. Political appointees and policy staff regularly 
work side by side with the technical staff to prepare an agency’s 
combined analysis and decision document. Even concepts of 
authorship and attribution within the agency are generally, but not 
always, foreign to how agencies work; indeed, the list of agency authors 
of a rule or preamble or even the supporting technical analyses may 
not even be available.287 In this institutional setting, the “[c]ivil servants 
. . . are not directly protected against political interference with or 
overriding of their professional judgments.”288 
With that understanding, the courts, Congress, the agencies 
themselves, and the scientific community and media are examined to 
determine how well they discourage the political manipulation of 
science in practice. 
 
 286. WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 123 (observing that “the agencies under 
study generally did not disaggregate their analyses into . . . separate steps”). This unitary agency 
description may less accurately describe multimember agencies like the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the National Labor Relations board 
where each commissioner has his or her own staff in addition to the general agency staff.  
 287. Id. at 130–31 (observing that, at least at the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, there is no meaningful form of authorship or attribution for agency 
staff). 
 288. Doremus, supra note 124, at 1637.  
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A. Courts 
In theory, the courts should be capable of providing the most 
direct check on the politicization of science in regulatory 
decisionmaking. But in practice, courts have rarely intervened to 
address the incidents reported in Part I (less than 15 percent of the 
time). What accounts for this apparent failure of the courts to protect 
the agencies’ use of science against political manipulation? One 
important reason is the expense of litigation. For thinly financed public 
interest groups, litigation has high opportunity costs and involves 
delicate priority setting. Despite the reports of considerable public 
interest litigation in the 1970s,289 current rates of challenges by public 
interest groups to health and environmental regulations appear to be 
relatively low. In an empirical analysis of all rules promulgated in the 
air toxics program, one of this Article’s coauthors reported public 
interest litigation rates of less than 10 percent.290 Public interest groups 
readily concede that this low rate is a reflection of limited resources 
and not an indication that the other rules were considered 
acceptable.291 
For litigation to serve as an effective deterrent to the politicization 
of science, public interest groups must also have the investigatory 
firepower to learn of this political manipulation in the first place. There 
is little indication that these resources are available in most settings. 
One public interest attorney conceded that even the choice of which 
rules to read and comment on involves back-of-the-envelope, triage-
like decisions made necessary by scarce resources.292 In a number of 
studies, half of the health and environmental protection rules were not 
commented on by anyone other than industry and some states, even 
though the rules involved issues of considerable public importance.293 
But even in a hypothetical world in which richly subsidized public 
interest groups are able to investigate and use the court system to full 
advantage, litigation is a limited tool at best for discouraging the stealth 
use of science as a deregulatory strategy. It is very difficult to persuade 
a reviewing court to set aside an agency deregulatory action under the 
 
 289. Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1727 (2012). 
 290. Id. at 1745. 
 291. Id. at 1746–47. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 1785–86 (summarizing this literature). 
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deferential “arbitrary and capricious” test of the APA.294 Perhaps more 
limiting is the stark reality that litigation tends to drag on for years, 
which could be consistent with deregulatory goals in some cases. 
Consider, for example, a statute mandating that the agency promulgate 
standards for air toxins by a deadline.295 If the administration develops 
a legally risky deregulatory approach to the technical analysis that 
faces a risk of being upended in litigation, the consequence of failure is 
that no rule is in place until the agency writes a legally supportable 
regulation.296 Either way, an administration bent on deregulation wins. 
Several of the examples cited in Part I also suggest that when they 
do become aware of deregulatory manipulation of science, courts are 
reluctant to point fingers at the political process in concluding that the 
actions are “arbitrary and capricious.”297 Indeed, even when the record 
and briefs are rife with evidence of political tinkering as the cause of 
the alleged agency transgressions, the courts seem to focus instead on 
the agency’s explanations and not on the individual actors within and—
in the case of White House intervention—external to the agencies.298 It 
is the unitary agency’s work that is arbitrary and capricious, and it is up 
to the agency to fix the problem as the agency is the author. The 
political actors are spared the bad publicity. 
B. Congress 
Congress can also become an adversary when it discovers the 
political manipulation of science in regulatory agencies. When 
Congress is interested in conducting effective oversight, the tools are 
many and include: letters of concern to agencies; subpoenas of 
documents; brutal oversight hearings; requests for NAS, GAO, and 
inspector general review; documenting abuses in reports and other 
forms of embarrassing publicity; and amendments to statutes that 
reduce agency discretion. Yet in our accounts, the role of Congress was 
generally effective only when at least one house of Congress was 
 
 294. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, President Trump’s War on Regulatory Science, 43 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (analyzing these challenges in detail). 
 295. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (2012). 
 296. Wagner, supra note 289, at 1750–59. 
 297. See, e.g., note 133 and accompanying text. 
 298. In Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the court reversed and remanded 
one of EPA’s secondary standards for lack of support in the record. In doing so, however, the 
court never mentioned the extensive evidence in the briefs that it was OIRA’s intervention that 
created the problem, as opposed to EPA itself. See, e.g., Final Opening Brief of State Petitioners 
at 32, Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 08-1200). 
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controlled by a party other than that of the president. Democrat-
controlled Congresses during the Reagan administration and the final 
two years of the George W. Bush administration went to great lengths 
to spotlight and condemn the ways that political appointees had 
manipulated science.299 Some of these congressional interventions even 
took the form of amendments to the authorizing legislation to limit 
discretion of the agency.300 
On the other hand, when the parties controlling the White House 
and Congress are aligned, the tools available to Congress are more 
limited—primarily consisting of the minority’s documentation of 
problems (for example, through committee staff reports, GAO studies, 
and inspector general reports).301 The information gathering tools 
available to the minority are still very valuable, but they are insufficient 
to ultimately reverse or even significantly expose deregulatory 
manipulations of science. 
C. Agency Counter-Pressure 
Agency career employees have not always taken political 
manipulation of agency science lying down. Put simply, alterations to 
the scientific record cut right to the heart of the staff’s role and the 
agency’s mission. And many career staffers are deeply committed to 
the agency’s mission, or they would have sought higher paying or more 
prestigious jobs. Indeed, as we detail above, in many cases the 
manipulations were publicized only because agency staffers were 
willing to call out the clandestine activities of politically appointed 
officials. 
The ability of an agency’s career staffers to serve as a check on 
political manipulations, however, is only as strong as the external 
oversight mechanisms available to them. And in the case of the 
 
 299. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 124, at 1634–35 (describing the backlash against the 
Reagan administration’s manipulation of scientific information concerning endangered species); 
see also generally MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS & OVERSIGHT FOR 
SUBCOMM. CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER, COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., 110TH CONG., NIPPING IRIS IN 
THE BUD: SUPPRESSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S 
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (June 11, 2009), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/
files/legacy/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/miller-iris-report-june-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5GHR-X2F8] (describing Bush OIRA’s effort at undermining EPA’s initiative to establish the 
scientific database Integrated Risk Information System). 
 300. See, e.g., James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 
1980’s, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351 (1986) (describing Congress’ efforts to legislatively force EPA to 
regulate under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act). 
 301. See infra Part II.C. 
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political manipulation of the scientific record, there are only limited 
oversight tools, such as congressional oversight hearings and the 
agency’s Office of Inspector General (which can sometimes be 
compromised itself by politics).302 Most remaining enforcement and 
oversight mechanisms are housed within the executive branch and 
subject to control by the same political officials the agency staff seeks 
to expose and possibly discipline. We examine the effectiveness of the 
most promising tools—science integrity policies, the use of science 
advisors, and staff whistle-blowing—below and conclude that, while 
important, they are not sufficient to counteract most of these scientific 
manipulations. 
1. Science Integrity Policies.  Most agencies now have scientific 
integrity policies in place to explicitly protect against the political 
manipulation of science.303 Reacting to perceived abuses of science 
during the George W. Bush administration, President Obama signed a 
memorandum in March 2009 asking the director of the OSTP to 
develop policies for ensuring scientific integrity in federal agency 
decisionmaking.304 In addition, each agency was to craft “rules and 
procedures to ensure the integrity of the scientific process within the 
agency.”305 Among the requirements are the commands that political 
appointees “should not suppress or alter scientific or technological 
findings,”306 and “[t]o the extent permitted by law, there should be 
transparency in the preparation, identification, and use of scientific and 
technological information in policymaking.”307 Finally, agencies should 
put “in place procedures [for] identify[ing] and address[ing] instances 
in which the scientific process or the integrity of scientific and 
technological information may be compromised,” procedures to 
protect whistleblowers, and additional procedures “to ensure the 
integrity of scientific and technological information and processes” 
relied on by the agency.308 
 
 302. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 124, at 1646 (discussing the potential politicization of 
OIGs). 
 303. For an excellent review of these policies, see Lin, supra note 294, at 37–40. 
 304. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 
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It took over a year for the OSTP to develop scientific integrity 
policies for the agencies to use in crafting their own policies. The OSTP 
memorandum told the agencies to develop policies that “[e]nsur[ed] a 
culture of scientific integrity.”309 Among other things, the 
memorandum stressed that “[i]n no circumstances may public affairs 
officers ask or direct Federal scientists to alter scientific findings.”310 
Additionally, agency selection of members of advisory committees had 
to be “based on expertise, knowledge, and contribution to the relevant 
subject area.”311 
Twenty-four departments and agencies promulgated scientific 
integrity policies in response to the memorandum.312 EPA published its 
policy in May 2011, and established a “Scientific Integrity Official to 
champion scientific integrity throughout the Agency.”313 Among other 
commitments, the EPA policy declared that it was “essential that 
political or other officials not suppress or alter scientific findings.”314 It 
further “[p]rohibit[ed] all EPA employees, including scientists, 
managers, and other Agency leadership, from suppressing, altering, or 
otherwise impeding the timely release of scientific findings or 
conclusions.”315 It demanded that agency employees “act honestly and 
refrain from acts of scientific misconduct,” which included 
“fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism.”316 The policy “[r]ecognize[d] 
the distinction between scientific information, analyses, and results 
from the policy decisions made based on that scientific information,” 
 
 309. Memorandum from John P. Holdren to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 1 (Dec. 
17, 2010). Agencies were to “[s]trengthen the actual and perceived credibility of Government 
research” by ensuring that the data used in decisionmaking underwent peer review, setting clear 
standards governing conflicts of interest, and “adopting appropriate whistleblower protections.” 
Id. at 1–2. Other goals were to “[f]acilitate the free flow of scientific and technological 
information” and “[e]stablish principles for conveying scientific and technological information to 
the public.” Id. at 2. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 3. 
 312. RASHIDA NEK & ANITA R. EISENSTADT, SCI. & TECH. POL’Y INST., REVIEW OF 
FEDERAL AGENCY POLICIES ON SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY III (2016). 
 313. U.S. EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY 1 (2012); see also Hannah Hess, Science 
Watchdog Investigating Pruitt’s CO2 Remarks, E&E NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.ee
news.net/eedaily/stories/1060052478/search?keyword=Science+Watchdog+Investigating+Pruitt’
s+CO2+Remarks [https://perma.cc/7SJT-MZLF]. The policy “reaffirm[ed] and promot[ed] 
scientific integrity” by “supporting the culture of scientific integrity, enhancing transparency 
within scientific processes, and protecting Agency scientists.” U.S. EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY 
POLICY, supra 313, at 3. 
 314. U.S. EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY, supra note 313, at 1. 
 315. Id. at 4. 
 316. Id. 
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and it insisted that “quantitative conclusions . . . not be influenced by 
possible risk management implications of the results.”317 Finally, the 
policy extended the agency’s existing whistleblower protections to all 
“employees who uncover or report allegations of scientific and 
research misconduct, or who express a differing scientific opinion, from 
retaliation or other punitive actions.”318 
EPA’s program is considered a particularly rigorous one, in part 
because it is one of the few that establishes an independent scientific 
officer.319 EPA’s program also prohibits precisely the activities of 
concern here that contribute to the political manipulation of science.320 
However, enforcement of EPA’s scientific integrity policy is limited. 
As Professor Lin observes, “EPA’s policy expressly states that it offers 
internal guidance and creates no enforceable obligations.”321 Lin also 
details a recent, failed effort to apply the policy against false statements 
made by Administrator Pruitt.322 Lin concludes from this experience 
that—aside from the lack of meaningful sanctions—even “establishing 
a violation of EPA’s scientific integrity policy may not be easy.”323  
As long as implementation of these scientific integrity policies is 
triggered by self-policing and self-enforcement by agency employees, 
their ability to protect against the manipulations described in Section I 
will be limited at best. The scientific integrity officer can focus public 
attention on violations of the policy through reports that are amplified 
in the news media, but that appears to be the extent of their power. As 
one USDA scientist candidly reported, its scientific integrity policy was 
“kind of a nicety with no real meaning.”324 
 
 317. Id. at 3–4. 
 318. Id. at 5. 
 319. Kimberley A. Strassel, Anatomy of a Deep State, WALL STREET J., May 26, 2017, at A15. 
The current occupant of that position, Francesca Grifo, a former advocate at the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, has proactively promoted that topic by holding well-attended meetings and 
workshops for agency employees and stakeholders. Zack Colman, Phone Lines Maxed Out for 
Scientific Integrity Meeting, E&E NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/
2017/10/02/stories/1060062275 [https://perma.cc/W48A-YMY6]. 
 320. See supra notes 313–18 and accompanying text. 
 321. Lin, supra note 294 (manuscript at 48). 
 322. Id. (manuscript at 48–49). 
 323. Id. (manuscript at 48). 
 324. Some Scientists Say Their Work Has Been Altered, E&E NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060053414/search?keyword=Some+Scientists+Say+T
heir+Work+Has+Been+Altered [https://perma.cc/YM6R-V3RX]. 
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2. Science Advisory Boards.  Several regulatory statutes create 
scientific advisory committees to review the work of agency scientists 
and provide advice on regulatory issues, and agencies frequently create 
science advisory boards on their own.325 A scientific advisory 
committee can lend the patina of objectivity to science-based agency 
decisions that can be very useful to an agency that is under attack in 
the political arena.326 At the same time, we have observed a number of 
instances—more than 30 percent of our accounts—in which scientific 
advisory committees have blown the whistle on low visibility attempts 
by upper-level decisionmakers to manipulate science to achieve 
predetermined outcomes.327 In the course of judicial review, courts in 
fact sometimes rely on criticisms by scientific advisory committees to 
support conclusions that agency actions are arbitrary and capricious.328 
EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, for example, has 
on several occasions complained rather loudly that the administrator 
ignored its advice on NAAQS in an effort to make the standards less 
burdensome for the affected industries.329 A working group of EPA’s 
Science Advisory Board circulated a memorandum in May 2018 
containing recommendations for full board review of several of the 
agency’s proposed deregulatory actions during the Trump 
administration.330 The memorandum, which was reported in the trade 
press,331 contained several rather strong criticisms of pending EPA 
actions, including the Agency’s reconsideration of its final 
determination of emissions standards for automobiles, national 
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants for hydrochloric acid 
production residual risk, and the repeal of emissions requirements for 
 
 325. See generally JASANOFF, supra note 207 (providing book-length treatment of the 
operation of science advisory boards in the United States). 
 326. Id. at 206. 
 327. We categorized and tabulated all of our accounts in Part II that involved public 
reprimands or sanctions for the executive branch’s manipulation of science. Of the twenty-two 
documented incidents that involved public reprimands of some form by Congress, the courts 
(through litigation), agency staff, or science advisory boards, seven (or 30 percent) involved 
criticism from a science advisory board. 
 328. See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 521–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 329. See, e.g., supra notes 130–32, 144 and accompanying text. 
 330. Memorandum from Alison Cullen, Chair, Science Advisory Board (SAB) Work Group 
on EPA Planned Actions for SAB Consideration of the Underlying Science, to Members of the 
Chartered SAB and SAB Liaisons (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter Cullen Memorandum]. 
 331. E.g., Marianne Lavelle, Pruitt’s Anti-Climate Agenda is Facing New Challenge from 
Science Advisers, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (May 23, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
23052018/scott-pruitt-epa-climate-change-clean-power-plan-scientific-review-board-trump-
administration [http://perma.cc/9R64-WD6S]. 
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“glider” trucks.332 The working group pointedly noted a “trend” in 
which the agency’s air office was providing less information to the 
Scientific Advisory Board about planned actions333 in an apparent 
effort to limit the Board’s input. 
Yet once again, this particularly important shield against 
politicization of science is limited by the reality that political 
appointees usually though not always control when a science advisory 
board is consulted and how that board is staffed. With the exception of 
a few statutory programs,334 there are virtually no legal constraints over 
these decisions. Even the composition of such boards is largely subject 
to political manipulation.335 
3. Staff.  Career agency scientists provide another valuable 
institutional check on manipulation by upper-level political 
appointees. These career staffers can serve as the ballast that keeps the 
agencies operating in accordance with professional norms that resist 
ends-oriented political intrusions. The staff, whether or not its work is 
disclosed to the public, still creates the initial scientific record to inform 
policy; this record at least creates a speed bump that political 
appointees must find a way around to advance ends-oriented policies. 
In nearly half of the stealth tactics discussed in Part I, the role of 
staff was pivotal in calling attention to the political manipulation of 
science.336 Some career scientists have resisted political changes to their 
analyses or conclusions.337 Other scientists have called attention to 
attempted manipulations, sometimes by leaking the evidence and 
documents to the press or posting them on the internet and sometimes 
by formally blowing the whistle on inappropriate actions.338 Moreover, 
 
 332. Cullen Memorandum, supra note 330, at 3, Table 1. 
 333. Id. at 7. 
 334. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2012). 
 335. See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook, Science, Politics, and Federal Advisory Committees, 350 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1454, 1456 (2004) (discussing criticisms of the George W. Bush administration 
for stacking science advisory committees). 
 336. In our categorization and tabulation referenced in supra note 327, ten out of the twenty-
two documented incidents involved some form of public reporting or whistleblowing by the 
agency staff themselves. 
 337. See, e.g., supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 338. Zack Colman, Climate Study Quietly Underway Warns of Severe U.S. Impacts, E&E 
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060058498/search?keyword
=Climate+Study+Quietly+Underway+Warns [http://perma.cc/NV65-KEU4]; John H. Cushman, 
Jr., Speaking Truth to Power on Climate Change: Why the U.S. Report Leaked, INSIDECLIMATE 
NEWS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/09082017/climate-change-science-
report-leaked-truth [http://perma.cc/NAU9-659L].  
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when career staffers are called upon for explanations by Congress, 
some have been quite forthright in acknowledging efforts by political 
officials to meddle with the scientific record underlying regulations.339 
The group Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility 
(“PEER”) also uses reports from existing staff to probe into agency 
decisions. PEER files a FOIA request about once every three weeks, 
often to probe matters brought to its attention by government 
employees.340 Another group, called “314 Action,” has established a 
secure hotline and an encrypted email drop through which government 
scientists can report abuses to lawyers and receive advice on their legal 
options.341 
In some cases, these staff reports can lead to adverse consequences 
for the offending political appointees. When Assistant Interior 
Secretary Julie MacDonald was caught bullying scientific staff into 
changing their scientific analyses involving endangered species, for 
example, the DOI’s Inspector General documented her activities and 
she resigned.342 
Former agency staffers can also serve as valuable informants on 
the manipulation of science after they retire from service. One group 
of former EPA staffers, for example, has formed an organization called 
the “Environmental Protection Network” to keep an eye on that 
agency’s activities and comment publicly on abuses when its members 
detect them.343 Among other things, it wrote a lengthy critique of 
Administrator Pruitt’s “transparency” proposal.344 
But even with these important innovations, there are limits to 
what the career staff can accomplish. Political bullying of agency 
 
 339. One EPA senior science adviser testified before Congress, for example, that EPA 
Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances asked her to employ a risk 
assessment model based on a scientific theory that she had never heard of to ensure a smaller risk 
estimate for the fumigant ethylene dibromide. LASH, supra note 53, at 173.  
 340. Amanda Reilly, Group, Firm Offer Pro Bono Help for Federal Scientists, E&E NEWS 
(Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060064627/search?keyword=Group
%2C+Firm+Offer+Pro+Bono+Help+for+Federal+Scientists [http://perma.cc/TD9W-ZY3J]. 
 341. Nick Bowlin, Political Group Seeks Federal Whistleblowers, E&E NEWS (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/stories/1060065401/search?keyword=Political+Group+Seeks+F
ederal+Whistleblowers [http://perma.cc/M2NX-ED6W]. 
 342. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLICY 1–8 (2008). 
 343. About Us, ENVTL. PROTECTION NETWORK, https://www.environmentalprotection
network.org/about [http://perma.cc/2R7V-XEE6]. 
 344. ENVTL. PROTECTION NETWORK, COMMENTS ON EPA’S CENSORED SCIENCE 
PROPOSAL (2018), https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
08/EPN-Censored-Science-Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/K7TY-BCHA]. 
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scientists can still lead to scientifically compromised decisions. The 
White House has demanded changes to scientific records that even 
strong career staffers were not able to prevent.345 Moreover, since the 
political officials decide what counts as “deliberative process” 
privilege, the staff would seem relatively helpless—short of filing 
formal whistleblower complaints—to expose these tactics to the light 
of day. 
D. The Scientific Community and the Media 
The scientific community has been heavily involved in publicizing 
and disciplining political manipulation of science in the agencies.346 The 
UCS, editors of top scientific journals, and respected scientists have 
penned reports, articles, commentaries, and editorials that document 
numerous problems.347 Soon after the 2016 elections, for example, 
“[m]ore than 2,300 scientists, including twenty-two Nobel Prize 
winners, [wrote] an open letter to President-elect Donald Trump and 
the 115th Congress, urging them to adhere to high standards of 
scientific integrity and independence” in addressing environmental 
problems.348 Scientists are working with public relations experts to 
hone their communications skills to facilitate interactions with the 
public and the media.349 The annual meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science in February 2017 featured 
a panel on “Defending Science and Scientific Integrity in the Age of 
Trump.”350 
 
 345. See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text. 
 346. Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 697–98. See generally David P. Clarke, Sound Science or 
Political Science? Federal Agencies Respond to Trump, 34 ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 2017 (noting 
scientists’ attempt at pushing back against Trump Administration’s attempt at politicizing and 
ignoring science). 
 347. See, e.g., Berg et al., supra note 276; Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 696–97; Jonathan 
M. Samet, Thomas A. Burke & Bernard D. Goldstein, The Trump Administration and the 
Environment — Heed the Science, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1182, 1186 (2017). 
 348. Juliet Eilperin & Chris Mooney, Over 2,000 Scientists Urge Trump to Respect ‘Scientific 
Integrity and Independence’, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2016) (quoting Letter from Union of 
Concerned Scientists to President-Elect Trump and the 115th Congress (Nov. 30, 2016)), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/30/22-nobel-prize-
winners-urge-trump-to-respect-scientific-integrity-and-independence/?noredirect=on&ut%E2
%80%A6&utm_term=.7c7fe8b38788 [http://perma.cc/QYT3-WRG7]. 
 349. Debra Kahn, Scientists Fearing Trump ‘Lobotomy’ Clamor to Speak Out, E&E NEWS 
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060049090/search?keyword=
Scientists+Fearing+Trump+%E2%80%9CLobotomy%E2%80%9D+Clamor+to+Speak+Out 
[http://perma.cc/7XMA-TZPR]. 
 350. Lindzi Wessel, Hundreds Rally for Science at Demonstration near AAAS Meeting, 
MCGARITY & WAGNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:58 PM 
1782  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1719 
The March for Science that took place on Earth Day, 2017 in 
Washington D.C.—in the pouring rain—and 600 other cities 
throughout the world demonstrated a willingness of scientists and their 
supporters to defend the integrity of government science despite their 
historic reluctance to engage in politics.351 The clear message of the 
march—which was sponsored by a number of mainline scientific 
organizations, including the American Geophysical Union—was that 
many people “want government policies built on evidence and reason, 
not ideology.”352 A recent study showed that speaking out against 
abuses of science does not undermine the credibility of the scientists 
who do so.353 
Persistent investigative journalists in the mainstream media and 
the trade press are responsible for documenting most of the instances 
of manipulation identified in Part I. Even here, however, there are 
limits to what journalists can accomplish. In some cases, reporters for 
certain news outlets have been barred from covering government 
events.354 In any event, like the proverbial tree that falls unheard in the 
forest, if there is no attentive or powerful audience to hear the stories, 
adverse news coverage will not go very far in disciplining these 
practices. 
Even if scathing criticisms of the political manipulation of science 
and publication of abuse in the media activate a larger public to clamor 
for change, the elected president and sitting Congress can nonetheless 
choose to ignore or even discredit such efforts as “junk science” and 
 
SCIENCE (Feb. 19, 2017, 6:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/02/hundreds-rally-
science-demonstration-near-aaas-meeting [http://perma.cc/BTQ2-RK8M] (emphasis omitted). 
 351. See Joel Achenbach, Ben Guarino & Sarah Kaplan, Why People are Marching for 
Science: ‘There is No Planet B’, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/big-turnout-expected-for-march-for-science-in-dc/2017/04/21/67cf7f90-
237f-11e7-bb9d-8cd6118e1409_story.html?utm_term=.21499f7a93bb [https://perma.cc/D395-
PULK]; John H. Cushman, Jr., Tens of Thousands March for Science and Against Threats to 
Climate Research, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
22042017/march-for-science-scientists-climate-change-donald-trump-climate-denial [http:// 
perma.cc/SA3F-DND5]. 
 352. Cushman, Jr., supra note 351; Wessel, supra note 350. 
 353. Hannah Hess, Clarion Call for Scientists: ‘Use Your Voice . . . Or Lose It’, E&E NEWS 
(June 22, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060056452/search?keyword=Clarion
+Call+for+Scientists%3A+%E2%80%9CUse+Your+Voice+.+.+.+Or+Lose+It [http://perma.cc
/354R-9J5G] (citing John E. Kotcher, Teresa A. Myers, Emily K. Vraga, Neil Stenhouse & 
Edward W. Maibach, Does Engagement in Advocacy Hurt the Credibility of Scientists? Results 
from a Randomized National Survey Experiment, 11 ENVTL. COMM. 415 (2017)). 
 354. See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Jaclyn Peiser, Three Reporters Are Turned Away from an 
E.P.A. Event, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/
reporters-epa-event.html [http://perma.cc/AKV3-CBEN]. 
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“fake news.” As with all of the tools described above, change can only 
come after the public reacts to reports of abuse and demands change. 
Even then, change may have to await the next election cycle, at which 
point dozens of other critical issues may have crowded out regulatory 
agency abuse of science on the electorate’s policy agenda. 
III.  REFORM 
Given the limited deterrents to political manipulation of science 
in regulatory decisionmaking, the fact that it sometimes occurs should 
not be surprising. Indeed, the accounts detailed in Part I may only 
represent the tip of the iceberg since, from the standpoint of most 
political appointees, the choice between failing the president and 
risking censure for politicizing science is often a simple one. 
Appointees’ careers suffer if they cannot advance the administration’s 
agenda and their professional ambitions often appear to dovetail with 
their own ideological commitments. As Phil Cooney, the former chief 
of staff of the White House Council on Environmental Quality under 
George W. Bush who edited climate change reports,355 observed: 
“When I came to the White House, my loyalties – my sole loyalties – 
were to the President and his administration.”356 Political appointees 
also generally plan to work in the agency for a limited time and find it 
easy to move to lucrative opportunities in private sector jobs when 
their government service is over.357 Even appointees who are 
terminated early for violating a scientific integrity policy to advance a 
 
 355. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 356. Allegations of Political Interference with Government Climate Change Science: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 327 (2007) (statement of Philip 
Cooney, former Chief of Staff, White House Council on Environmental Quality). Even when the 
results are personally embarrassing, the terminated appointee can remain loyal to the mission, 
although perhaps not to the president. As Anne Gorsuch, a former EPA administrator who 
resigned in the wake of scandals occurring during her tenure, observed in her memoir: “When 
congressional criticism about the EPA began to touch the presidency, Mr. Reagan solved his 
problem by jettisoning me and my people, people whose only ‘crime’ was loyal service, following 
orders.” Patricia Sullivan, Anne Gorsuch Burford, 62, Dies, WASH. POST (July 22, 2004), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2004/07/22/anne-gorsuch-burford-62-dies/ 
78b89129-728a-404e-8550-7b5617d5f291/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1c2eddfe337c [https:// 
perma.cc/GK95-FTN3] 
 357. See, e.g., Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. 
Financial Industry: 1909-2006, at 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14644, 
2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/w14644.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MCV-G3T3] (observing that 
“[g]iven the wage premia that we document, it was impossible for regulators to attract and retain 
highly-skilled financial workers, because they could not compete with private sector wages”). 
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deregulatory agenda may be greeted with open arms in the private 
sector. 
These strong incentives operating on political appointees to 
manipulate science make it difficult to devise penalties that adequately 
change their behavior. Self-restraint and after-the-fact sanctions, 
including termination of appointees, seem insufficient to deter the 
temptation to meddle with the technical analysis to advance the 
president’s agenda. 
The most promising antidote thus involves fortifying agency 
decisionmaking processes proactively to impede this ends-oriented 
manipulation of science. Politically appointed officials seeking to 
adjust the scientific record must not be allowed simply to pick up the 
phone, walk down the hall, or issue a directive ordering the agency’s 
scientists to adjust analyses to support predetermined outcomes. 
Instead, agency decisionmaking procedures should insulate the career 
staff from political interference at this particularly crucial stage of its 
expert work. 
To help ensure that regulatory decisionmaking reflects the best 
available science, we therefore recommend that the decisionmaking 
process be reconceptualized in a way that provides scientific 
independence for the expert staff at the first stage of literature 
synthesis.358 In this reimagined institutional blueprint, the scientific and 
technical staffs’ analysis of the relevant scientific information would be 
published as an initial assessment, and the staff would be separated by 
firewalls from the rest of the decisionmaking process while preparing 
that analysis. Political appointees attempting to influence the initial 
assessment in violation of the firewalls would suffer significant adverse 
consequences for their reputations and future employment. 
A bifurcation of the decisionmaking process and firewalling of the 
initial scientific analysis does not require the staff to separate “science” 
from “policy,” because the technical analysis will usually uncover 
significant uncertainties, the resolution of which will involve a 
combination of scientific and policy judgment.359 But a rigorous 
 
 358. For some literature in accord with this view, see, e.g., Doremus, supra note 124, at 1640–
48, and David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 
439 (2002). 
 359. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in 
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and 
OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979) (discussing the significant policy choices in science-intensive 
regulatory questions); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995) (same). 
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technical analysis does involve separating out the understanding of the 
“facts” in the existing record and identifying the uncertainties in the 
scientific data and models. In our reformed process, the career staff 
would become insulated, like other neutral advisors (for example 
judges and prosecutors), from outside influence so they can do this 
work in as “neutral” a fashion as possible. Moreover, these firewalls 
would be clear, visible, and enforced to impede efforts at tweaking the 
science or dictating new procedures at the outset. Political appointees, 
policy staff, and the White House would still be able to reject, 
distinguish, correct, or ignore this scientific record. And they would still 
determine the content of the policy that the agency uses in resolving 
uncertainties in the scientific and technical information. But unlike the 
current institutional design in most agencies, the staff’s version of the 
relevant scientific information would be documented and serve as the 
record for judicial review. Politically appointed officials would have to 
grapple with this record and could no longer change it. 
This final Section discusses the literature that supports the general 
idea of firewalls that separate the initial technical analysis from the 
larger policy decision. It then offers preliminary suggestions for how to 
operationalize this new blueprint for regulatory decisionmaking 
involving science and policy and identifies various questions and 
concerns that should be considered moving forward. 
A. Firewalling the Scientific Literature Review and Analysis from 
Policy Input 
At the end of her comprehensive analysis of the politicization of 
environmental science during the George W. Bush administration, 
Professor Holly Doremus concludes that “[t]he single biggest 
contributor to the lack of political integrity in this administration’s 
environmental-policy decisions is the absence of barriers between 
political appointees who view their mission as the single-minded 
advancement of the President’s policy agenda and career employees 
charged with providing scientific advice or analysis.”360 We agree. 
Virtually all of the stealth science strategies discussed in Part I 
involve political manipulations during this early stage of agency 
analysis, when the staff synthesizes the existing scientific literature that 
bears on the issues that arise in a rulemaking. In these scientific 
manipulations, staffers are censored, edited, constrained, depleted, or 
 
 360. Doremus, supra note 124, at 1640. 
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their work is reviewed by potentially biased experts. The target in these 
stealth-science strategies is consistently the underlying scientific 
record. The object is to alter it so that the “facts” are consistent with 
deregulatory policies in ways that do not encounter legal impediments 
or serious public opposition. 
The solution must therefore take the form of stronger barriers 
between the technical analysts and the political appointees at this early 
step when the scientific and technical analysis is being conducted. 
Nearly every regulatory decision of any consequence by an agency 
involved in health, safety, or environmental regulation begins with a 
literature search and synthesis of the available information that speaks 
to issues relevant to the decision.361 This step—whether separated 
explicitly in the agency decision process or not—involves 
characterizing the existing scientific literature and highlighting any 
remaining gaps, uncertainties, and open questions relevant to the issues 
raised by the regulation.362 
Given executive incentives, the best way to institute this firewall 
is through passage of a new “regulatory science” law. The law would 
be brief and serve as a type of meta-administrative law statute that 
legally prescribes a bifurcated process for informal rulemakings, 
guidances, and other formal agency decisions.363 Specifically, the law 
would instruct that when agencies integrate scientific information into 
their assessments, they must provide assurances that the information is 
assessed and analyzed by agency expert staff with complete 
independence from the political process, even while the inevitable 
nonscientific choices and framing in the technical assessments are 
carefully explicated.364 Equally important, this more specific directive 
 
 361. WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 111–12. 
 362. Id. at 120–23. 
 363. Several other regulatory science laws have in fact been passed or proposed over the last 
decade, although these laws are problematic both in their scope and demands on the agencies. 
See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher, & Pasky Pascual, Whose Science? A New Era in 
Regulatory “Science Wars,” 362 SCIENCE 636, 636 & 38 (2018) (describing the Honest Act  passed 
by the House in 2017). 
 364. Such an approach thus sidesteps disagreements about what is “science” and what is 
“policy.” In the first instance, the technical staff identifies and assesses the entire technical record. 
This work will necessarily include nonscientific considerations, but the staff (and peer reviewers) 
will be expected to identify the materials they considered and explain them clearly. There may be 
disagreements between management and the technical staff about both the science and the other 
inevitable judgments, but the point is simply to use this bifurcated process to bring them out into 
the open. Rather than allowing political officials full access to the staff assessments before they 
are made public, the firewall provides a clearer window inside the sequential process, including 
identifying authorship and attribution which otherwise is lost under the current nonprocedural 
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for the use of science would be enforced through judicial review. 
Courts would be tasked with reviewing challenges to the agency’s 
fidelity to the firewalls, as well as to the requirement that the agency 
clearly explain how the agency assessed the relevant scientific 
information and trace the role it played in the final decision. This legal 
mandate would thus provide a sharper focus for the courts’ review of 
science than is currently present in judicial review of agency 
rulemakings.365 
1. Support for Firewalls.  Diverse prominent committees and 
theorists converge on the wisdom of insulating the initial staff analysis 
of the literature and evidence from later decisions about whether or 
how that scientific record should inform policy. The clearest statement 
of this principle comes from the NAS’s “Red Book,” published in 1983 
and commissioned specifically to speak to the optimal organizational 
design of agencies with respect to resolving science-policy questions.366 
Although the Red Book was most influential in underscoring the many 
uncertainties and judgments that populate risk assessments, making 
the separation of science and policy impossible as a practical matter,367 
a close look at the report also reveals that the Committee on the 
Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health, in the 
National Research Council, believed that for purposes of agency 
decisionmaking, it was still beneficial to conceive of and structure the 
agency analysis in two distinct steps.368 The first step involves the 
synthesis and characterization of the scientific literature, a 
characterization that would include identifying uncertainties, 
 
approach to science integration used in a number of agency programs. 
 365. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 145, at 2068. Of course, ensuring the judicial remedies are 
significant enough to change the incentives of the political actors is also important. We discuss 
sanctions for political officials at infra notes 400–03. On the agency side of the ledger, the remedies 
also need to be sufficient to encourage agency staff compliance. The article by Rob Glicksman 
and Emily Hammond provides superb attention to this neglected topic. See generally Robert L. 
Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 
DUKE L.J. 1651 (2019) (discussing courts’ remedial options in instances of what the authors term 
“regulatory slop”). 
 366. COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, 
COMM’N ON LIFE SCIS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., RISK ASSESSMENT 
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 2–3 (1983) [hereinafter NAS, RED 
BOOK]. 
 367. See, e.g., Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: An Uneasy 
Divorce, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 99, 99 
(Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991) (discussing artificial separation of risk 
assessment and risk management, as well as the problems that separation creates). 
 368. NAS, RED BOOK, supra note 366, at 2–3. 
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variability, and other open questions left for policy judgment.369 This is 
the “risk assessment.” The second step would then entail decisions 
about whether or how to use that factual record.370 In the Committee’s 
view, this separation was vital to ensure the quality of the agency’s 
science-based decisions: 
When a fully documented written risk assessment is not produced 
before an agency’s decision to regulate or not to regulate, it is difficult 
to understand the process by which an agency made its assessment. 
The Committee believes that the creation of such a document 
encourages public understanding of and respect for agency 
procedures and provides a basis for review by a scientific advisory 
panel.371 
The Committee also believed that this type of rigorous two-step 
process would help make the policy choices clearer. In the Committee’s 
words, “a detailed risk assessment document that clearly identifies the 
inference options chosen in the assessment and explains the rationale 
for those choices will help to maintain a sharper distinction between 
the science and policy.” This sequential analysis, when done properly, 
helps to “guard against the inappropriate intrusion of risk management 
[i.e., overt policy] considerations” into the agency’s assessment of the 
relevant scientific literature.372 
Work in the academic field known as “public administration,” as 
well as related legal literature on institutional design, provides similar 
support for this type of distinction between the initial technical analysis 
and later policy discussions.373 As then-Judge Breyer observed, “[a] 
depoliticized regulatory process [that is based in expertise, 
 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 148 (emphasis added). 
 372. Id. Thus, while the Committee was not enthusiastic about devising a separate, centralized 
technical unit within government to do this work throughout the report the committee 
consistently treated and discussed these two steps of analysis and “management” (or policy 
decisions) as distinct analytically in the decision process. See id. at 6, 139–40, 143. Considerable 
attention was paid, for example, to developing rigorous peer review of the agency’s technical and 
scientific analyses (but not the “management”). See, e.g., id. at 144–45 (discussing the functions 
of review panels). 
 373. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (discussing how agencies’ experience, 
appreciation of complexities and policies, and responsible treatment of the facts “justif[y] the use 
of the administrative process”); see also, e.g., H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, KEVIN B. SMITH, 
CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER & MICHAEL J. LICARI, THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY 
PRIMER 2 (2d ed. 2012) (identifying as one of the “elemental features of public administration” 
individual competence, “which include[s] . . . expertise”).  
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rationalization, and insulation] might produce better results, hence 
increased confidence, leading to more favorable public and 
Congressional reactions.”374 This critical agency independence is 
generally satisfied by staffing the agency with career professionals and 
then requiring those professionals to meet high analytical standards, 
including identifying the question at hand, explaining their analyses, 
and subjecting their work to review by experts before policymakers are 
involved.375 In this way, “political influence should not undermine the 
deliberative benefits that agency rulemaking delivers.”376 
Finally, the expert agency—by definition—brings technical tools 
and expertise to the table that otherwise might be lacking. Although 
these experts do not have magic answers and their technical analyses 
are rife with judgments and human biases, the collective work is 
constrained by professional norms and methodological rules. Their 
work is also by nature inquisitorial rather than adversarial.377 The 
technical staff seeks out the best understanding of the problem and the 
best options. And their work will be scrutinized by other technical 
experts with similar standards and demands. 
2. Precedent for a Firewall.  Although the notion of a firewall 
around an initial technical assessment may seem radical and even 
fanciful, there is considerable precedent for the concept. In one of 
 
 374. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 55–56, 59–60 (1993). 
 375. See, e.g., FREDERICKSON ET AL., supra note 373, at 2 (identifying as one of the elemental 
principles of public administration “the organization as distinct from the persons holding 
positions or offices in it”). “Politics” and “administration,” just like “science” and “policy” cannot 
be separated cleanly, id. at 98, but that is a different issue than separating agency choices from 
White House choices, which goes to the institutional source of control rather than the nature of 
the substantive issues at stake. Indeed, the control-of-bureaucracy theory identifies two 
competing models—one being an agency controlled by political actors and one made by 
administration actors. See, e.g., id. at 16 (elaborating on control-of-bureaucracy theory). 
 376. Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1451 (2013); see also Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory 
State, 27 J.L. & SOC. 38, 55 (2000) (touting the importance of checks and balances in which 
“opposed maximizers” hold one another in check); cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY 83–89 (2007) (describing a similar, sometimes 100-person intra-agency discourse 
arising within the executive intelligence community to check against group think and collectively 
work through difficult security challenges). 
 377. See generally Robert J. MacCoun, The Epistemic Contract: Fostering an Appropriate 
Level of Public Trust in Experts, in MOTIVATING COOPERATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
AUTHORITY: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE (Brian H. Bornstein & 
Alan J. Tomkins, eds. 2015) (developing the concept of adversarial versus inquisitorial 
approaches in science-policy). 
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EPA’s most successful programs, the NAAQS standard-setting 
process, EPA divides the scientific analysis of the relevant scientific 
research into four separate reports that fit neatly within our suggested 
process.378 Each of these reports provides a different, focused analysis 
of the existing literature and is prepared by EPA’s technical staff.379 
And each of the reports is both publicly reviewed and peer reviewed 
and published as a stand-alone report.380 The scientific staff is also 
firewalled from political and policy interference; no ex parte contact is 
allowed from political officials while the staff conducts the literature 
search and analysis, although there can be meetings on the record.381 
A second analog for the firewall comes from the world of science 
research, where authorship, attribution, and independence are central 
prerequisites to publication.382 Some universities are quite vigilant 
about barring faculty researchers from signing contracts that give 
funding sponsors a right to control the research.383 Research 
independence is paramount to quality science. These “no strings” 
policies all seek to position researchers in the purest possible 
inquisitorial mode. 
A final analog comes from firewalls instated in institutions with 
the similar goal of insulating fact finders or “impartial” 
decisionmakers, like judges, from influence by those who have a stake 
in the decisionmaking outcome.384 Within the executive branch, entire 
enforcement units of the Department of Justice are walled off from 
 
 378. See WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 36, 39–40 (detailing EPA’s NAAQS 
process). 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. at 37, 39. 
 381. Id. at 39–40 (discussing NAAQS alignment with agency policy assessments over political 
interests). 
 382. See, e.g., Defining the Role of Authors and Contributors, INT’L COMM. OF MED. J. 
EDITORS, http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/defining-
the-role-of-authors-and-contributors.html [https://perma.cc/34WZ-67EX] (“Authorship confers 
credit and has important academic, social, and financial implications.”). See generally Conflicts of 
Interest, INT’L COMM. OF MED. J. EDITORS, http://www.icmje.org/conflicts-of-interest 
[https://perma.cc/7UGA-FM4X] (offering an illustration of one of these conflicts of interest 
forms). 
 383. See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho, Ryo Shohara, Anna Schissel & Drummond Rennie, Policies 
on Faculty Conflicts of Interest at US Universities, 284 JAMA 2203, 2203 (2000) (finding that 55 
percent of policies required faculty disclosures and 19 percent specified limits on faculty financial 
interests in corporate sponsors of research). 
 384. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); see also 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1951) (holding that decisions/factfinding 
by a hearing officer become part of the relevant record for “substantial evidence” review even if 
otherwise overtaken by decisions/factfinding by the agency head(s)).  
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political officials through “limited contacts” policies that bar 
communications between the White House and enforcement 
personnel on specific cases.385 As a recent report by the Brennan 
Center explains: 
These policies recognize that political actors are, at least in part, 
motivated by political concerns that should not affect the application 
of the law and that law enforcement personnel are better situated to 
make decisions about specific cases or investigations. They guard 
against overt direction from the White House, or the use of investiga-
tive agencies to punish political foes. They also protect against the 
inadvertent pressure or bias that may result from a call from a White 
House official about a specific matter. Even a question about a case 
can lead an official to presume an interest in its outcome; the official 
then may try to ensure the desired outcome. As former Attorney 
General Benjamin Civiletti put it, presidents and other top officials 
“unintentionally can exert pressure by the very nature of their 
positions.”386 
The Brennan Center report also notes, however, that “[u]nfortunately, 
it has become increasingly clear that these voluntary policies, without 
formal legal requirements or enforcement mechanisms, cannot prevent 
political interference in law enforcement activities.”387 Yet the 
existence of these policies suggest that it is possible to construct a 
firewall within the bureaucracy to keep politics out of sensitive matters 
that demand objectivity. 
3. Practical Implementation.  With the basic concept in place, we 
now turn to how an agency might actually accomplish the redesign of 
agency decisionmaking in practice. Although many options are 
available, we propose three specific reforms to the existing law and 
agency practice. The reforms consist of: a formal firewall around the 
agency staff’s initial technical analysis, which would be published 
 
 385. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to White House Staff 
1 (Jan. 16, 1996) (“Unless you are certain that a particular contact is permissible, you should take 
care before making the contact to consult with the Counsel’s Office.”); see also Memorandum 
from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, to All White House Staff 1 (Jan. 27, 2017) 
(“Communications with DOJ about individual cases or investigations should be routed through 
the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or Solicitor 
General, unless the Counsel’s Office approves different procedures for the specific case at 
issue.”). 
 386. PREET BHARARA ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER, NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON RULE OF 
LAW & DEMOCRACY, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 18 (2018). 
 387. Id. 
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separately; more rigorous legal controls on the establishment of 
scientific advisory boards and the selection of peer reviewers by 
political appointees; and revisions to the rules governing the 
deliberative process exemption to the FOIA. The most important by 
far is our first suggested reform—proposing a formal firewall for the 
technical analysis. But all three reforms are important and ideally 
would be instituted simultaneously. This part closes with a discussion 
of the future issues and challenges that lie ahead for such a project, 
including the obvious question of the political feasibility of this reform. 
a. Design of the Firewall.  Our proposal draws institutional 
boundaries around agency experts to preserve the integrity of their 
initial scientific assessment. In proposing this firewall we reiterate that 
we are not naively assuming that science and policy are cleanly 
separable. However, the evidence amassed in this Article supports the 
view that the work of the technical staff and that of the political 
management are distinctive and distinguisable. At base, then, our 
proposal simply seeks to keep these two sources of analysis separate in 
a way that allows others to understand the contributions of technical 
staff versus the contributions of political officials. This separation is 
accomplished by introducing mechanisms to ensure the transparency 
and responsibility of authorship. Moreover, in proposing this kind of 
firewall, we seek to place primary responsibility for the initial technical 
assessment with agency staff rather than political officials. This 
placement of the technical analysis with agency experts still appreciates 
that the technical synthesis will entail considerable judgment. Indeed, 
that recognition simply places more onus on the staff to explain their 
discretionary choices as best they can. Other checks and balances we 
propose will help hold the expert staff accountable for accomplishing 
this difficult task honestly. 
More specifically, we propose that in any covered agency action, 
the professional staff’s literature search and analysis of the existing 
scientific literature should be published as a separate report before the 
agency’s policy analysis begins. The work of the agency staff in 
producing this initial report, but not their work afterwards, would also 
be firewalled from all political communications. Both features of this 
reform should be legislated and codified in enforceable rules that 
create severe sanctions for meddling with this sacrosanct stage of the 
agency’s analysis. 
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The firewall would include the following steps: 
Framing the Charge. The “charge” or factual questions the 
technical staff needs to research would be driven by the agency’s 
statute or the subject matter of the regulation being promulgated. The 
questions that frame the scientific analysis must be stated clearly at the 
outset, and they will likely be formulated by the policy staff and/or 
political appointees. To that end, the agency could hold a scoping 
meeting to assist in crafting the charge for the technical assessment.388 
The resulting draft charge to the technical staff could even be subject 
to notice and comment, as is currently the case currently under the 
NAAQS process.389 
Moreover, although it will also often be useful to engage the 
technical staff to assist in framing the question, the staff’s role at this 
stage would be placed on the record. Politically appointed officials 
could convene meetings protected by the deliberative process 
privilege, but when technical staff who will be charged with conducting 
the work are involved at the framing stage, all discussions would have 
to be recorded and be made public.390 
Publishing the Staff’s Technical Report. Once it has received the 
agency’s charge, the career scientific staff would be solely responsible 
for conducting a comprehensive literature search and analysis of the 
information relevant to the questions.391 The career staff’s initial report 
would synthesize the literature as it pertained to the questions at hand, 
highlighting not only the points of convergence but also the remaining 
open questions, uncertainties, and variability.392 This analysis could 
 
 388. WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 32 (describing a “kick-off” workshop and 
planning report). 
 389. Shapiro, Fisher, &Wagner, supra note 180, at 493–94 (outlining this scoping step under 
the NAAQS process). 
 390. Wagner, supra note 145, at 2066 (describing this step and the supportive literature in 
more detail). 
 391. Ideally, a detailed firewall protocol could be crafted by the NAS or some independent 
group and would itself be firewalled from political officials. The protocol could be codified as a 
regulation that is binding on the agency and perhaps could even be enforced by third parties. 
Adjustments to this procedural set of rules would require notice and comment and could be 
litigated. Congress could even establish the terms of how these firewall-design rules should be 
prepared to ensure that they are both rigorous and will help protect the independence of staff 
scientists. However they are created, it is important to have clear rules that define and protect the 
staff workers from intervention through a relatively specific firewall mechanism. Cf. Doremus, 
supra note 124, at 1645 (emphasizing the importance of rules in this context as well). 
 392. See, e.g., id. at 1646 (recommending reforming the politicization of science by “requiring 
the preparation and release of reports signed by career technical employees at the outset of the 
regulatory process”). 
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also include developing computational models that provide different 
scenarios and identify underlying assumptions. The staff’s work would 
be insulated from any ex parte contact from policy officials and 
political appointees,393 and written documentation of any 
communications between technical staff and others within or outside 
the agency would be placed in the record.394 The staff’s final analysis 
would be published as a publicly available report. To increase 
accountability and to motivate staff experts, authorship and attribution 
should be afforded all analysts for individual contributions in the 
report. The record should also contain the identities of any peer 
reviewers, along with documentation of their contribution to the 
review.395 Ideally, opportunities for dissent among staff should also be 
provided, perhaps at the close of the full report or each section within 
the report.396 
Peer Review of the Technical Report. It is important to gather 
outside expert reviews of the staff’s technical report to ensure 
complete, rigorous, and accurate use of the literature and identification 
of uncertainties. This peer review would be conducted by the very top 
experts with as few ties as possible to the overarching policy 
outcomes.397 The extent and nature of the peer review will vary. For 
 
 393. See, e.g., id. (similarly proposing “requiring the preparation and release of reports signed 
by career technical employees at the outset of the regulatory process, or explicitly requiring that 
the inputs of scientific staff into decision-making processes be included in administrative records 
and made subject to FOIA”). 
 394. See, e.g., id. at 1646–47 (proposing this type of requirement); see also Lisa Schultz 
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the 
Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 96 (2006) (stressing that earlier 
involvement of OIRA into agency rulemakings requires transparency, ideally implemented as 
docketed communications).  
 395. See, e.g., WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 36, 129–32. Attribution should also 
be afforded for peer reviewers, and all comments should be on the record. Unlike journal peer 
review which concerns individual actors and benefits from anonymity, when what is at stake is the 
integrity of an agency technical analysis that informs public policy, all scientists should be able to 
stand behind their work and comments.  
 396. Id. at 132–35 (describing a formal dissent process at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and recommending it be adopted more widely within the Executive branch); see also Doremus, 
supra note 124, at 1645–46 (suggesting a similar type of dissent process for highlighting problems 
internally). 
 397. We do not agree with former EPA Administrator Pruitt that experts who have grants or 
contracts with EPA should be excluded from the pool of peer reviewers for that reason. Letter 
from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, EPA, to Assistant Adm’rs, Reg’l Adm’rs & Office of Gen. Counsel 
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/final_draft_fac_
memo-10.30.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N4Z-XL53]. We cannot see how working with EPA to 
answer important empirical questions relevant to regulatory issues could possibly bias a scientist 
for or against the staff’s position on a particular scientific question, especially in a deregulatory 
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particularly significant questions, the report could be reviewed by an 
advisory board. For smaller projects, the agency could solicit individual 
reviewers to provide reviews.398 In all cases, however, the reviewers 
should represent the best experts with the least conflicts of interest in 
the matters at hand.399 
Enforcement. As a legal matter, the firewall would need to be a 
legislative creation that could be rigorously enforced.400 Government 
officials who violate the terms of the firewall must be sanctioned 
severely.401 Sanctions would range from public admonishment to 
termination of employment with civil fines. An investigation that 
uncovers a violation would also have to consider how to reconfigure 
the process in a way that protects the firewall against similar intrusions 
in the future. 
Additional mechanisms for institutional oversight will likely be 
needed, given the difficulty of ensuring compliance. For example, 
Congress or the agencies may also task science-integrity offices with 
actively monitoring interactions between politically appointed officials 
(including White House officials) and scientific and technical staff to 
ensure staff independence at this initial technical stage. Even informal 
methods—like leaks to journalists and Congress—can help focus 
political attention on nontransparent encroachments by upper-level 
 
administration in which the staff and upper-level political decisionmakers may not agree on 
regulatory outcomes. 
 398. See WAGNER, ACUS Study, supra note 111, at 113–15 (discussing these various options 
in more detail). 
 399. The goal of this peer review step is to subject the staff analysis to a second look by a 
group of experts who are external to the agency. We are cognizant of the fact that this second 
group, however constituted, will also offer their critique with black-boxed expert judgments that 
remain hidden from public view. See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 207, at 157–59. However, 
precisely for these same reasons, a second expert review of the staff analysis is better than no 
critical review at all. And, of course, once the staff report (and peer review comments) are 
introduced to the full range of agency decisionmakers and stakeholders, there will be further 
scrutiny applied to possible hidden judgments embedded in the analysis because of the adversarial 
nature of the proceedings. 
 400. See, e.g., BHARARA ET AL., supra note 386, at 17–19 (calling for the same approaches to 
“limited contacts” policies used as firewalls in enforcement cases). 
 401. Enforcement would most often be triggered by employee complaints (including 
anonymous complaints), which would trigger an investigation from a science integrity unit in the 
agency or the inspector general. Employees whose complaints are judged frivolous by an 
independent investigator could also be subject to sanctions, including possible termination. Cf. id. 
at 20 (recommending that for limited contacts policies, “Congress should establish a clear 
mechanism within the executive branch for investigating instances of inappropriate interference 
with law enforcement for political or personal ends” and suggesting that these offices should be 
existing offices of inspector generals). 
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policymakers and White House officials into the staff’s scientific 
analyses. These news leaks have played an important role in 
disciplining abuses in the past, and they can continue to serve this role 
in the future.402 Because staff self-reporting of inappropriate political 
interventions is likely to remain an important ingredient to meaningful 
reform, agencies should vigorously maintain whistleblower 
protections.403 
To further reinforce effective enforcement of the firewall, agency 
scientific assessment programs should be audited periodically by some 
independent observer like the NAS. In addition to identifying 
problems, these independent assessments should help improve how the 
agencies design and implement firewalls. Particularly in the early years, 
these audits are likely to be quite important. 
The Management Firewall. The entire operation of the scientific 
and technical staff and the agency’s scientific integrity office should be 
located inside the firewall to protect them from political interference. 
The management of these technical personnel—their budget, their 
assignments, and their hiring and firing—should also be protected by 
the firewall.404 Career managers would do the hiring and firing, make 
the assignments, and propose annual budgets that could be considered, 
alongside the administration’s proposal, by Congress.405 These 
managers would not report to personnel within the agency, but instead 
to an independent unit, perhaps even a new agency in the 
Congressional Research Service or the GAO that retains 
independence from the executive branch. The hiring of these key 
career managers would also be managed by this outside, independent 
 
 402. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 461, 478 (2010) (suggesting that expert analysts should always be allowed to speak 
publicly about their work). Again, at least in the area of national security, the use of leaks has 
been quite valuable in highlighting internal process problems. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 376, 
at 72. 
 403. See, e.g., KITROSSER, supra note 279, at 126–27 (discussing external and internal checks, 
such as whistleblower protections and less restricted communications between agency scientists 
and the public, that can be placed to improve information integrity in the executive branch). 
 404. Managers would also be responsible for filing detailed annual reports that make their 
decisions transparent, including decisions about staffing priorities, the staff’s fidelity to the 
firewall (along with reports of breaches), the staff’s performance, and other details. Staff would 
be invited to comment on the reports to ensure they are as factually accurate as possible.   
 405. Thus, while the political officials will ultimately decide budgets for the entire agency, 
even at this step the career managers will identify their priorities and make their case. This 
information will be shared with Congress and the public to hold the political officials’ requests 
more accountable. 
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agency. Managers would also be protected from disciplinary action 
except through the office that hired them. 
b. Concerns and Qualifications.  There are both conceptual and 
practical challenges to our proposal to firewall the technical analysis 
and related decisions from an agency’s regulatory decisionmaking 
process. These challenges are considered roughly in order of 
importance, except for our final discussion of political feasibility. 
Where there’s a will, there’s a way. The most obvious concern with 
the proposals advanced here is that political officials will find a way 
around this firewalled structure to meddle with the technical analysis 
of the underlying research if the incentives are powerful enough. In 
cases where politics can still permeate our suggested approach, the 
reform will backfire by producing a façade of scientific independence 
that further misleads onlookers. Alternatively, political appointees 
who find themselves blocked by these firewalls and related legal 
prohibitions could give up on science altogether or find a way to 
eliminate the technical units and devise a much more politically 
oriented approach to developing the scientific record. This has long 
been a concern, for example, with the use of ombudsmen to represent 
underserved communities and interests.406 The proposals, under this 
view, are just stopgaps subject to a kind of nuclear arms race that will 
find a way to sidestep legal constraints in ways that become ever more 
dangerous over time. 
Given the significance of the problems detailed in this Article and 
the perverse role that the current unitary blueprint of the agency plays 
in allowing political appointees to manipulate science, however, at least 
some experimentation with firewalls seems warranted. In order to 
provide an early warning of attempts to circumvent the firewalls, some 
anticipatory measures could be instituted to detect and publicize them. 
For example, regular audits of the processes could be instituted in the 
initial design of the firewall or requested by members of Congress or 
other parties. The audit would investigate how well the firewall is 
working in practice and trace out complaints or other evidence of 
problems. Indeed, anticipation of the audit itself may also serve as a 
partial deterrent against circumvention attempts. 
 
 406. WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 63 (1983) 
(“An organization that depends exclusively on legislators for funds will not deliberately 
antagonize its legislative benefactors. In contrast, an organization that has the option of raising 
funds through a variety of methods will be less constrained.”).  
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Ensuring Scientific Integrity. A reverse concern holds that the 
technical staff itself will be badly biased in ways that are difficult to 
detect or control. In the public health field, there are concerns that the 
staff could consist of public health missionaries and zealots who err on 
the side of caution in ways that go well beyond what the evidence 
suggests is necessary. Such systemic biases in the work of the technical 
staff could introduce accountability problems because they will be 
difficult to catch and correct. 
Peer review and public notice and comment of each staff report 
should help to expose some staff bias. To be sure, this will only work if 
the peer reviewers are selected to be fair and skeptical. Public review 
is also an important antidote to these concerns; under current 
administrative procedures, these staff reports would be scrutinized not 
only by the administration, but also by high stakes groups during the 
decisionmaking process. This scrutiny will be particularly intense when 
the staff’s findings cut against the interest of stakeholders who have 
ample resources to engage in the process.  
Nevertheless, to provide further assurance that the staff reports 
are even-handed, an audit of the staff processes by an external 
scientific body like the NAS might again prove useful in ensuring that 
the firewall approach is working. Perhaps staff could also be 
encouraged to present the technical reports at professional meetings or 
even publish them or some part of them in scientific journals. The more 
that these staff reports are treated as legitimate reviews of the scientific 
literature within the profession, the more likely it is that they will meet 
professional standards of quality and integrity. 
Utilization. One of the most significant difficulties with the firewall 
concept is ensuring that the technical assessment is in fact conducted 
when needed. To address this risk, an initial scientific assessment could 
be made mandatory as a prerequisite for all agency rules and guidances 
that rely on scientific information. This mandate could also extend to 
other agency science-intensive directives and policies. For example, 
within one year after the agency launches a new project, it could be 
considered a breach of the firewall not to convene a firewalled staff 
assessment. In some matters, the staff may have nothing to add, but 
consultation would be mandatory. Although this type of trigger may 
leave some important agency decisions unprotected, experience can 
hopefully be used to fine-tune the appropriate legal trigger. 
Increasing Red Tape. Another worry is that the entire process 
might become bogged down in red tape so that it becomes little more 
than a paper tiger. Staff could dally on their technical assessments. 
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Policy officials could ignore much of what the staff assessments offer. 
And onlookers might well become too exhausted by the dual filings 
and technicalities to identify, much less to file comments on or litigate 
possible abuses. The already protracted and complicated rulemaking 
process could become more so with little apparent offsetting 
advantage.  
However, if technical staff appreciates that more accessible 
analyses will serve as a vital means of educating stakeholders and the 
public, then the firewalls could produce stronger, more 
comprehensible agency reports that communicate scientific 
information more clearly than 500-page reports written in technical 
jargon that few can understand.407 The more significant challenge may 
be the converse—that the policy officials will not take the reports 
seriously or will attempt to misrepresent the staff analyses in ways that 
are difficult to catch. One way to make the political officials’ use of the 
scientific record more transparent is to subject the final policy decision 
to both staff and scientific review to spotlight these points of 
manipulation and/or to add a role for staff dissent on the final decision. 
Polarization. The firewall idea poses a very real risk of a 
polarization within the agencies between career staff and political 
appointees. Although this tension is something that has occurred in 
past administrations in any event, our proposal could fan existing 
flames. At least some experimentation to date, however, suggests that 
this particular concern may not be a problem in at least some agencies. 
The fact that EPA has successfully experimented with the firewall 
concept for more than a decade in the NAAQS program, for example, 
gives some reason to believe that such a structure will in fact prove 
viable.408 In fact, if the rules for staff independence were clearer, the 
tensions between career and political staff might actually decrease. 
Political Feasibility. To be effective, the proposals advanced here 
must be imposed on the executive branch by Congress through 
legislation and enforced by the courts. Although the expectation of 
congressional intervention in this highly polarized age might seem 
farfetched, improving the scientific integrity of regulatory decisions, at 
least in the abstract, should not be a partisan matter. In the course of 
our research on deregulation, we have uncovered more than a few 
allegations that appointees of Democratic presidents, particularly 
 
 407. See, e.g., WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 123–24 (observing this in the 
NAAQS policy assessments). 
 408. See id. at 29–40 (describing the NAAQS process). 
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Presidents Clinton and Obama, engaged in similar manipulative tactics 
to increase the stringency of regulation. For example, the strict 
adherence to worst case assumptions, including the protective linear 
dose response curve in carcinogen risk assessment models, has been of 
concern to the chemical industry for decades.409 At bottom, this 
concern is driven by the belief that the agency is employing such 
models in unjustifiably protective ways that do not employ the best 
scientific evidence.410 
Indeed, all of the affected interest groups from all sides of these 
issues—affected industries, public interest groups, scientific 
organizations—purport to want regulatory decisions to be based on 
sound science. If that is the case, repairing structural deficiencies in 
institutional design should draw bipartisan support. Legislation that 
improves the scientific integrity of agency decisions in ways that curb 
presidential power could also be the type of legislative reform that is 
attractive to members of Congress who are well aware of the fact that 
administrations—and hence the scope of a political party’s power—can 
swing dramatically from one election cycle to another. Finally, if media 
coverage and reactions of the scientific community to political 
manipulation are indications of the public’s current sentiment toward 
these issues, the legislation should draw strong public support. It is 
possible, in other words, that the merits of instituting processes that 
deter the political manipulation of science may be so clear that 
legislation may be politically viable at some point in the future, at least 
when the sitting president is not likely to veto the bill. 
B. Reinforcing Reforms 
Beyond the firewall, other reinforcing legal reforms are needed to 
ensure adequate separation of the staff technical analysis from the 
policymaking apparatus. We identify two additional reforms below. 
1. Science Advisory Boards.  The Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (“FACA”) provides the legal rules governing the establishment of 
 
 409. See, e.g., EPA’s Proposed Rule on Transparency in Regulatory Science Gets It Right When 
It Comes to the Best Available Science and Non-linear Modeling Approaches, AM. CHEMISTRY 
COUNCIL: AM. CHEMISTRY MATTERS (May 3, 2018), https://blog.americanchemistry.com/2018
/05/epas-proposed-rule-on-transparency-in-regulatory-science-gets-it-right-when-it-comes-to-
the-best-available-science-and-non-linear-modeling-approaches [https://perma.cc/7PSB-XART]. 
 410. See James W. Conrad, Jr., The Reverse Science Charade, 33 ENVTL L. REP. 10306, 10306–
08 (2003). 
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science advisory boards,411 but with respect to ensuring objectivity, 
FACA (and its authorizing regulations) only provides that the 
committee membership must “be fairly balanced in terms of the points 
of view represented and the functions to be performed.”412 As a result, 
the FACA statute and its implementing regulations leave the necessary 
qualifications, conflict disclosures, and other decisions regarding the 
selection of scientific peer reviewers unspecified and therefore largely 
legally unconstrained.413 
As long as FACA gives political appointees this broad discretion 
in assembling science advisory boards, some administrations will 
exploit that freedom to stack or otherwise manipulate peer review 
bodies to achieve favorable outcomes. As the HHS spokesperson 
conceded in defending the George W. Bush administration’s stacking 
of scientists to serve on CDC’s Advisory Committee on Childhood 
Lead Poisoning Prevention, “it [is] disingenuous to criticize the Bush 
administration for installing like-thinking individuals [on science 
advisory boards] when every administration does that. . . . That’s like 
saying, Gosh, there’s gambling going on in this casino.”414 
More precise legal ground rules governing science advisory boards 
are long overdue. In addition to amending FACA to constrain agency 
discretion in selecting scientific advisory committees, Congress should 
specify rules—perhaps by linking legal requirements to existing 
scientific practices in force at the biomedical journals—to govern 
agency selection of individual scientific experts to serve as peer 
reviewers when there is neither time nor money to create full advisory 
boards. There are several useful models for devising these reforms.415 
However it is done, a revised process must establish legal guiderails for 
the design of these science advisory boards and peer reviewers that 
curb opportunities for political manipulation. 
 
 411. 5 U.S.C. app.2 § 3(2) (2012). 
 412. Id. § 5(b)(2). 
 413. See generally GAO, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE 
COULD HELP AGENCIES BETTER ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE (Apr. 2004) 
(recommending “promising practices and measures that can better ensure independence and 
balance and promote transparency in the federal advisory committee system”).  
 414. Dan Ferber, Critics See a Tilt in a CDC Science Panel, 297 SCIENCE 1456, 1457 (2002) 
(quotations omitted). 
 415. See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER, supra note 238, at 17–26 (providing detailed 
proposals). 
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2. Deliberative Process Privilege.  The deliberative process 
privilege currently protects internal political discussions, including 
those involving the manipulation of scientific information, from public 
view through an exception to FOIA.416 Reform, at a minimum, should 
legislatively limit this deliberative process protection so that it does not 
cover political manipulation of science.417 In her article touting the 
virtues of presidential administration, Justice Kagan in fact gestured 
towards the need for greater transparency in the executive’s 
engagement with the scientific record.418 She suggested, for example, 
that presidential review should not only “operate with an attitude of 
respect toward agency experts,” but also that “these differences 
[between the expertise of agencies and the White House] counsel 
hesitation both in acknowledging and asserting presidential authority 
in areas of administration in which professional knowledge has a 
particularly significant and needed function.”419 
As a first step, the deliberative process privilege should be revised 
to exclude any discussions that violate the firewall proposed here. 
Deliberative process protection should also not extend to any 
communications that violate scientific misconduct rules or scientific 
integrity rules promulgated by agencies. Scientific misconduct in most 
agencies involves the “fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in 
proposing, performing, or reviewing scientific and research activities, 
or in the publication or reporting of these activities; scientific 
misconduct does not include honest error or differences of opinion.”420 
These decisions about whether communications violate deliberative 
process, and hence must be made public under FOIA requests, should 
be made by the scientific integrity officers, the respective Office of the 
Inspector General, or some other neutral group. 
CONCLUSION 
Like playing with fire, politicians playing with scientific 
information can be dangerous. Part I of this Article has demonstrated 
how politically appointed officials, on both sides of the aisle, can 
employ many strategies to manipulate or ignore scientific information 
 
 416. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). 
 417. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 124, at 1646 (similarly suggesting that agency scientific 
recommendations should be subject to FOIA and not exempted as deliberative process).  
 418. Kagan, supra note 281, at 2356. 
 419. Id. 
 420. U.S. EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY, supra note 313, at 4. 
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in ways that allow agency decisions to reach politically predetermined 
outcomes. Convinced that such decisions are inconsistent with sound 
administrative practice and, in most cases, with agency statutes, we 
argue in Part II that existing legal and cultural constraints on such 
political manipulation are insufficient to prevent determined political 
appointees from employing those strategies. We therefore argue in 
Part III that more rigid rules are needed to constrain how regulatory 
agencies employ science in their decisionmaking processes. This 
includes a legally enforceable institutional design that bars some of the 
basic work of scientific and technical staff from influence by politically 
appointed officials. Until there are external controls on the 
manipulation of science by the executive branch, we expect the 
problems we have identified in Part I to steadily worsen. Our hope is 
that Congress will recognize the value of regulation based on properly 
vetted science and statutory policy and take action before fact-free 
decisionmaking to advance the policies of the chief executive becomes 
the norm. 
 
